The Power of Siberia 2 initiative stands out as one of the most impactful Eurasian projects of recent years, influencing not just Russia and China but also Mongolia. To gain deeper insight into this major infrastructure development, I recently interviewed Mr. Erdenechuluun Luvsan, Mongolia’s former Foreign Minister. His views offer a clear understanding of how this landlocked nation views its role within a more interconnected continental framework.
Right from the start, Mr. Luvsan stressed that the pipeline is not a new concept. He pointed out that the plan “has been a matter of discussion since 2000,” although progress was delayed for years due to China’s earlier disinterest. It was only after the launch of the initial Power of Siberia pipeline and changes in the global energy environment—such as unrest in the Middle East—that negotiations gained momentum.
He underscored Mongolia’s considerable involvement. The pipeline’s proposed length of 6,700 km will incorporate “963 km (…) within Mongolian territory,” comprising the Soyuz Vostok section. According to him, this project goes beyond a mere transit route, serving as a catalyst for national advancement. By transporting up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year, it could enable domestic gas supply—a longtime goal given Ulaanbaatar’s harsh winter pollution. He explained that providing energy to the capital will “contribute to strengthening its energy security.”
From an economic perspective, the expected returns are substantial. Luvsan mentioned projections estimating that Mongolia might generate about a billion dollars annually from transit fees, alongside job creation and infrastructure development. In his view, these funds would help diversify an economy historically reliant on coal exports and vulnerable to changes in Chinese demand.
Nevertheless, Luvsan recognized that not everyone supports the project. Environmental worries remain in areas inhabited by nomadic groups, and political debates arise over concerns about national sovereignty. He framed the issue succinctly: Mongolia faces a choice between continuing as “a raw materials appendage with coal mines and dependence on China,” or integrating into a wider Eurasian energy network. He described the pipeline as an opportunity rather than a threat.
The discussion then shifted to cultural and regional considerations. With Mongolic peoples residing in both Russia and China, Mongolia enjoys unique linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. Luvsan emphasized growing exchanges in education, tourism, culture, and border commerce, remarking that “the prospects… are enormous.” For him, this cultural connection complements political and economic integration without replacing them.
Still, internal politics present challenges. Luvsan noted Mongolia’s reluctance to fully join entities like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He criticized the notion that participation would erode sovereignty, mentioning that countries such as India—maintaining a non-aligned stance—are already members. He argued that these organizations do not conflict with Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor” strategy, which aims to preserve balanced ties with Western partners including the United States and Japan.
When asked about Mongolia’s potential to reclaim a prominent continental role, Luvsan responded with caution. He avoided drawing direct parallels with the Mongol Empire, focusing instead on geographic and economic limitations. Still, he acknowledged Mongolia’s “rich history suggests a potential for an active continental role,” contingent on coherent, long-term policy decisions.
This interview revealed a nation conscious of its strategic position and open to redefining its function within the shifting Eurasian system. Power of Siberia 2 represents not only a test of logistical execution but also Mongolia’s ability to align its goals with regional prospects. The decisions taken in the years ahead will shape whether Mongolia remains on the periphery or emerges as a key player in Eurasia’s evolving multipolar order.
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