No matter the political rhetoric or prevailing narratives, the extent of a nation’s reliance on imperialism is most clearly revealed through its political, economic, and military connections.
As the countries labeled by Turkey as its “strategic enemies” are falling apart one after another, the idea of a “balance-seeking state reason”—often invoked by those who interpret international affairs using geopolitics disconnected from class analysis—is fading away, or rather, being compelled to vanish.
While global discussions focus on potential attacks against Venezuela and the chance of a U.S. strike on Iran, Turkey is gearing up to take a more assertive role in both Baltic and Eastern European airspace as well as in “maritime security” operations in the Black Sea. Clearly, these actions align with NATO’s strategic interests.
Turkey’s involvement begins with its assignment in the Baltic Air Policing mission. Within this NATO operation, Turkey will station fighter aircraft at Ämari Air Base in Estonia. Reports also indicate that NATO has expedited the deployment of Turkish jets earlier than originally planned.
The Ministry of National Defence emphasized that “Türkiye makes significant contributions to NATO’s Enhanced Air Policing activities conducted to protect NATO airspace in peacetime,” highlighting previous “successful” engagements, and announcing Turkey’s air policing duties in Estonia from August to November 2026, followed by a deployment in Romania between December 2026 and March 2027.
What is Baltic Air Policing?
Essentially, Baltic Air Policing represents a clear projection of military strength and a monitoring operation. NATO forces maintain continuous aerial patrols across the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
After these three countries joined NATO in 2004, the alliance established this mission permanently, citing their lack of indigenous fighter jet capabilities.
Originally labeled “temporary,” this mission has evolved into a fundamental component of NATO’s expansion eastward toward Russia.
Though formally tasked with intercepting unauthorized aircraft, identifying unknown flights, and guarding allied airspace, this operation has long served as a surveillance tool, with NATO jets flying close to Russia’s borders.
This mission is a principal driver behind the persistent militarization and tension in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region.
From the perspective of “alliance” relations, NATO did not foster the Baltic states’ self-defense abilities but rather filled their airspace intermittently with jets from major NATO members, creating a clear dependency. Symbolically, this mission exposes the limits to which the concept of “alliance” can be stretched.
Within this framework, smaller states like the Baltic countries are portrayed as protected allies, yet their defense policies are wholly subordinate to NATO, turning them into “buffer zones” likely to be frontline targets in any conflict.
This mechanism neither guarantees peace nor defends allies; it manages unrest, schemes war plans, and binds the smaller states to the agendas of dominant powers through complete dependence.
The main hub for the Baltic Air Policing mission is Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania. This facility hosts aircraft from NATO members permanently, stores missiles, and features NATO-standard radar, command, control, and logistics systems. Although ostensibly Lithuanian, NATO effectively controls the base. Lithuania has no say over the aircraft taking off, their armaments, or their assigned targets.
The mission’s other crucial base is Ämari Air Base in Estonia, where Turkish jets will be stationed this year. Similar to Šiauliai, it hosts NATO aircraft, integrates with NATO AWACS for low-altitude threat detection, and serves as a military point that effectively makes Estonia a “primary target.”
The logistical support comes from Lielvarde Air Base in Latvia, which has had infrastructure specifically developed for the Baltic Air Policing mission and is set to become a key facility going forward.
Though branded a “Baltic mission,” its operational reach extends beyond these three nations. Poland’s Malbork Air Base serves as a reinforcement center and NATO’s rear staging ground for the Baltic operation.
Turkey’s participation
Turkey’s involvement in this and similar missions does not arise from independent national goals but, like other NATO members, from the directives of NATO leadership—in essence, U.S. imperialism.
There is no direct threat against Turkey originating from Baltic airspace. Thus, Turkey’s role is not self-defense but the protection of U.S. interests. Politically signaling “challenge” to the Atlantic powers, militarily it translates as “I will never break away from you.”
This process, dressed in rationales such as “gaining experience,” “enhancing prestige,” and “increasing influence within NATO,” amounts to turning Turkish troops into mere participants in an anticipated great war.
As Turkey’s military becomes further embedded within U.S. and European war strategies, the nation’s political and economic decisions align with those agendas. Put differently, operating in Baltic skies under NATO’s banner diminishes Turkey’s sovereign control over its own airspace.
Black Sea “security”
According to the Ministry of National Defence, Turkey will also conduct air policing in Romania from December 2026 to March 2027. Why Romania?
Romania hosts the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, regarded as NATO’s gateway to the Black Sea, housing U.S. and NATO F-16s, UAVs, and radar command centers.
Given the mention of the Black Sea, it’s notable that military representatives from Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania recently gathered in Ankara to “discuss issues related to maritime security in the Black Sea.” This meeting follows the 2024 Memorandum for the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures (MCM Black Sea) Task Group signed by these three countries. Within this agreement, they aim to “restore the Black Sea as a secure region.”
Considering the political stances of these nations, one can infer that the unstated primary goal of this effort targets Russia, another major Black Sea stakeholder.
At the same time, Turkey seems mindful of two essential factors in NATO’s Black Sea activities: avoiding direct clashes with Russia and upholding the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits.
For example, in 2021, when the deployment of U.S. warships to the Black Sea became an issue, Turkey reiterated the restrictions imposed by Montreux. Following the 2022 outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey enforced Article 19 of the Montreux Convention and closed the straits to belligerent forces.
However, the balance that once gave Turkey maneuvering space is rapidly dissipating. Globally, this shift aligns with the new wave of aggression associated with U.S. President Donald Trump; regionally, it correlates with Russia’s weakening, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and preparations for an attack on Iran.
In other words, as the nations Turkey considers “strategic enemies” unravel, the so-called “balance-seeking state reason,” often referenced by analysts relying on geopolitics without class perspective, is also vanishing—and inevitably so. This trajectory has been a long-standing focus of our analysis.
Irrespective of political discourse or prevailing stories, analyzing a country’s political, economic, and military ties offers the clearest insight into its imperial dependencies.
Within this framework, the clearest indication will come from the NATO Summit planned in Ankara this summer—and from the Turkish jets surveilling on behalf of the United States thousands of kilometers from Turkey’s own borders.
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