Yan XUETONG is a university distinguished professor and the Honored President of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University.
Since the Cold War, the terms “global order,” “world order,” and “international order” have often been used interchangeably in discussions of international relations, typically without precise definitions. This ambiguity has caused confusion, particularly when global order is mistaken for the international system or power structure. To clarify, this essay seeks to define global order by focusing on its essential elements: institutions, norms, and values.
Global order emerges when institutions, norms, and values operate effectively within the international system. The erosion of these pillars signals disorder or anarchy. The continuum between war and peace serves as a useful metaphor, with international order understood as a spectrum—from conflict (disorder), through an unclear middle ground, to peace (order).
Quantifying international order by measuring shifts between peace and war poses challenges. Thus, as I described in Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (2019), international order is “the state of affairs wherein players in a given international system settle their conflicts through nonviolent approaches according to interstate norms.” This characterization applies to different scales—regional or global—and underpins analyses of global orders since World War II.
Though global order and global system both engage with norms, they remain distinct concepts. The global system includes actors, norms, and configurations, whereas global order specifically involves norms, prevailing values, and the distribution of institutional power. As noted by Chinese scholar Zhou Fangyin in a 2021 essay for World Political Studies, “order is not an entity but a kind of soft existence.” Historical experience shows that although the global system developed by the nineteenth century, no global order existed during the two world wars of the twentieth century.
Frequently, global order is confused with international power structure, which is defined by polarity (such as unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity). Power structures represent the distribution of capabilities among leading states and form part of the global system, not the order itself. Ian Bremmer’s conceptualization of shifts from bipolar to unipolar to “G-Zero” orders exemplifies this blending of concepts.
Polarity cannot reliably indicate the effectiveness of global order, and changes in power—like Britain’s transition to U.S. primacy—do not automatically cause shifts in order. Regardless of their form, international orders feature stability, predictability, and cooperation. A system beset by war lacks order because of its instability and hostility. Conversely, international order flourishes where nonviolent mechanisms for conflict resolution and prevention prevail. Despite proxy conflicts, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and contemporary periods are regarded as ordered due to their relative systemic steadiness.
The nature of international order may evolve, and while scholars agree on its changeability, they differ in categorization. For instance, American political scientist John Ikenberry identifies balance of power, hegemony, and law-based orders; his Indian-born peer Amitav Acharya categorizes hegemony, conciliation, and community; Chinese academics Sun Xuefeng and Huang Yuxing recognize hegemony, balance of power, tribute, and community; meanwhile Liu Feng delineates seven types ranging from empire to multipolar coordination.
Rather than restricting frameworks to Cold War or liberal perspectives, I recommend defining global order according to core values, norms, and institutional power distribution. Norms are particularly influential in shaping order types. The post-Cold War era, marked by democratization and market reforms, is best described as the “globalization order.” In contrast, rising trends towards disengagement characterize the emerging “counter-globalization order.”
Certain global orders benefit a broader set of states and therefore attain wider acceptance. An effective order balances stability with popular support. Analogous to social structures—prisons being stable but unpopular, and bazaars unstable yet preferred—global orders that serve collective interests are favored over those benefiting only few, even if the latter possess greater stability.
This dynamic lies at the heart of the current divergence between Beijing and Washington. Both champion rules-based order but differ in its interpretation. Washington views China as seeking to alter the order away from universal principles, emphasizing the defense and reform of the post-World War II rules-based system to maintain peace and uphold rights.
China, having gained from globalization, supports its continuation but resists Western dominance. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi critiques the “rules-based order” as hegemonic, advocating for rules grounded in international law rather than selective Western imposition.
The dispute concerns not the existence of rules but whose rules will prevail. All social orders rest on rules, but the defining issue is their content and majority acceptance. This reasoning applies historically—such as how the Western Zhou’s Five Services shaped East Asian tributary order, or Rome’s preoccupation principle influenced African and Asian colonialism.
In the next decade, major powers will contest the form of the global order but not its existence. Nuclear deterrence has prevented direct great power wars since World War II and likely will continue. The Ukraine conflict exemplifies this: despite early threats, Russia refrained from nuclear escalation. Thus, although proxy conflicts persist, global order endures, reinforcing this essay’s focus on changes in order types rather than presence versus absence.
Some regard the Cold War and post-Cold War as phases of one liberal order. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, similar to Ikenberry, traces this order’s structure to Bretton Woods and postwar bodies like the UN, IMF, and WTO. Yet this view prompts questions: why separate these periods if the order remained constant? Why did the “liberal order” only emerge post-Cold War? And why is globalization central after the Cold War but not before?
Blurring periods obscures global order’s evolution. For example, Australian scholar Chris Ogden, in The Authoritarian Century: China’s Rise and the Demise of the Liberal International Order (2022), defines the era since 1945 as Pax Americana but argues a “new world order” emerged post-Cold War due to significant changes. Joseph Nye, in Is The American Century Over? (2015), contends the American century began in 1941 and continues, possibly until 2041. To understand today’s order, comparison with Cold and post-Cold War eras is essential.
The Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 ushered in U.S.-led unipolarity. President George H. W. Bush envisioned a “new world order” of peace and prosperity. While aspirational, this post-Cold War order differed in power distribution, values, and norms.
During the Cold War, leadership was divided between the U.S. and Soviet Union in political and security institutions, as seen in the UN Security Council and NATO versus Warsaw Pact alignment. Although economically stronger, the U.S. lacked full global political leadership. The Cold War ideology pitted capitalism against communism. Proxy wars reflected efforts to install ideologically aligned regimes but neither side achieved total dominance. The tripartite split among First World (U.S.), Second World (USSR), and Third World (non-aligned) revealed deep ideological fractures. The Third World encompassed varied ideologies beyond East-West conflict.
Sovereignty was paramount in Cold War norms. The 1945 UN Charter enshrined non-intervention, and violators justified actions as sovereignty defense. Conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and Arab-Israeli wars were framed accordingly, reinforcing sovereignty’s normative centrality.
The post-Cold War era brought transformation across global order’s dimensions. With the USSR’s end, the U.S. gained singular leadership, advancing liberal values and globalization norms, defining this new order.
The U.S. dominated political and economic institutions. UN Security Council resolutions on Kosovo, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Iran often reflected U.S. leadership. China, cautious of confrontation, frequently abstained, earning media nicknames like “Ambassador Abstention.”
Globalization norms mainly spread political democratization and economic marketization. Eastern Europe exemplified democratic shifts, while market reforms extended even to autocratic states such as China and India. China joined the WTO in 2001 following a mixed-economy transition; India opened its economy in 1991 after decades of protectionism.
Understanding today’s order requires moving beyond Cold and post-Cold War frameworks. Since the 1980s, “new Cold War” analogies have been used—from U.S.-Soviet rivalry to U.S.-Russia and now U.S.-China contests—but repeated starting-point claims have failed. Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan calls such analogies intellectually lazy and misleading regarding U.S.-China competition.
Unlike Cold War ideological clashes between capitalism and communism, current rivalries focus on technology supremacy. Ideological challenges stem from internal populism rather than external expansionism. Competition spans geographic and cyber domains, with cybertechnology pivotal. Russian military setbacks in Ukraine highlight this, leading Washington to adopt a “small yard, high fence” approach restricting China’s tech progress, while Beijing pursues “dual circulation” to boost domestic innovation. China aims for national rejuvenation, not global communism, and since 2017 pledges not to export its development model.
Washington has likewise abandoned Cold War goals of ideological expansion. Capitalism no longer serves as a global ideology, and liberalism is weakened by populism. Advocates focus on domestic liberal preservation rather than international promotion. Both capitals reject framing their rivalry as a new Cold War.
Proxy wars, critical during the Cold War, play a minor role in current competition. They neither advance technological edge nor justify resource expenditure. Consequently, the risk of proxy war over Taiwan is exaggerated. Beijing stresses peaceful reunification, recognizing innovation’s primacy for national rejuvenation. Russia’s Ukraine conflict offers cautionary lessons supporting such restraint.
Unlike the comprehensive division of U.S.-Soviet relations, Washington and Beijing retain economic and social interdependencies. China benefits from U.S. markets, technology, and education, resisting full decoupling. Both parties recognize that cutting ties between the two largest economies would destabilize global markets.
The U.S.-China rivalry differs fundamentally from the Cold War. The defining elements of ideological conflict, proxy wars, and total separation are missing. Instead, mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains central, setting today’s order apart.
Current competition is shaped by the emergence of counter-globalization, distinct from anti-globalization social protests and state-led de-globalization. Counter-globalization arises when major powers mutually pursue de-globalization policies.
Brexit in 2017 was an initial move toward de-globalization with limited global impact. A more significant turning point occurred in 2018 when Trump’s trade war with China targeted economies accounting collectively for nearly 40% of global GDP. The COVID-19 pandemic further accelerated the retreat from international connectivity. Thus, 2017–2020 marks the progression from post-Cold War globalization to counter-globalization.
The 2022 Ukraine war accelerated this trend as sanctions on Russia disrupted supply chains. The EU reduced reliance on imports of essentials such as food, medicine, raw materials, semiconductors, and digital technology. With no major power promoting globalization, the EU recognized the shifting order. Reflecting this, U.S. officials increasingly use “internationalization” instead of “globalization.”
Today’s power dynamics diverge from the Cold War’s bipolarity and the post-Cold War’s unipolarity, trending toward diffusion. Australia’s 2023 Defence Review observed that the United States no longer dominates as Indo-Pacific unipolar leader. U.S. withdrawals from bodies like the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, and the Paris Agreement have further eroded its global leadership. This trajectory began under Trump 1.0, persisted under Biden, and intensified during Trump’s second term.
Liberal norms are declining worldwide, while sovereignty has resurged, especially since the Ukraine conflict. NATO’s response to Russia focused on sovereignty violations rather than human rights, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine has been marginalized. Major powers now invoke sovereignty or human rights selectively to justify policies. During the 2023 Israel-Hamas conflict, Western states emphasized Israel’s sovereignty, while Beijing and many developing nations highlighted Palestinian human rights. This selective application reveals the decline of liberal norms and the reassertion of sovereignty.
Economic norms have shifted from post-Cold War marketization toward deglobalization, marked by protectionism, sanctions, and technological decoupling. Since 2018, key powers have tightened control over trade, investment, and data flows, while subsidizing domestic innovation. The U.S., once globalization’s champion, abandoned free-market ideals through trade wars, blocking WTO appellate appointments, and adopting protectionist laws like the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act. The EU, formerly a globalization advocate, now promotes “de-risking” and economic security, encouraging inward resilience over openness.
Global values are also evolving. Liberalism, dominant post-Cold War, faces decline under populism’s rise, especially in Western democracies where dissatisfaction with liberal norms has spurred political turmoil. Events like the January 6 U.S. Capitol attack underscored democratic fragility, emboldening authoritarian claims to legitimacy. Populism now shapes politics across Western and non-Western powers, with around 15% of nations governed by populists by 2025. Unlike authoritarianism as a governing style, populism positions itself as a global ideological challenger to liberalism. Thus, the current value clash is between populism and liberalism—not capitalism and communism.
These shifts distinguish today’s global order from the Cold War and post-Cold War orders. Over these eras, order evolved from ideological rivalry, to globalization, and now counter-globalization. Strategies progressed from proxy wars, to democratization and market reforms, and presently to deglobalization. Leadership moved from bipolar balances, to U.S. unipolarity, and now toward decentralization. Norms shifted from sovereignty primacy, to human rights dominance, and back toward a balance. Values transitioned from capitalism-communism rivalry, to liberalism’s predominance, to populism challenging liberalism.
Characteristics of the Current Global Order
Counter-globalization defines the present global order, much like ideological rivalry characterized the Cold War and globalization shaped the post-Cold War period. Additional defining factors include China’s rise, the digital revolution, and the spread of populism. Together, these trends reshape power distribution, strategic competition, and foreign policy priorities.
China’s rise commenced with Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms and became unmistakable when its GDP surpassed Japan’s in 2010. Concerned, the United States initiated its “Pivot to Asia,” acknowledging the world’s strategic center shifting from Europe to East Asia. While Europe remains relevant, it no longer anchors global competition; only China holds the capacity to challenge U.S. leadership systemically. Former President Trump referred to China-U.S. relations as “G2,” though he did not specify whether this meant confrontation or cooperation between the two superpowers.
Although sometimes labeled a junior superpower, China’s expanding influence dilutes U.S. dominance in global institutions. By 2022, China accounted for 15.25% of the UN budget, second only to the United States. Through funding, leadership roles, and entities like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—engaging 150 countries and 30 organizations by 2023—China substantially broadened its presence. Security-wise, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization expanded its membership and partnerships.
This rivalry pressures other countries to choose sides. European leaders, such as France’s President Emmanuel Macron, caution against being caught between Washington and Beijing, while many nations, recalling Cold War non-alignment, emphasize their “Global South” identities to maintain neutrality.
Strategic competition increasingly unfolds in cyberspace. Cyberattacks surged to over 1,100 incidents per organization weekly by late 2022, intensifying disputes over internet sovereignty. These digital assaults are perceived both as security threats and sovereignty violations, as shown by U.S. allegations of Russian electoral interference in 2020.
China advocates internet sovereignty to justify its cyber policies. Initially, the U.S. and Europe opposed this concept, favoring a “single internet.” For example, in 2010, Secretary Hillary Clinton promoted universal access. However, by 2020, U.S. policy shifted toward protecting its digital space. Secretary Mike Pompeo’s “clean network” initiative excluded Chinese firms from U.S. infrastructure, and later the Biden administration banned U.S. company dealings with TikTok and WeChat. Terms like “internet sovereignty,” “cyber sovereignty,” and “digital sovereignty” now dominate global discourse, reflecting cyberspace’s central role in strategic rivalry.
Counter-globalization is the guiding theme of today’s global order, just as ideological confrontation defined the Cold War and globalization the post-Cold War era. Additional hallmarks include China’s growth, digital transformation, and populism’s rise, all reshaping power, competition, and policy direction.
Xenophobia, Populism, and Economic Security
Populism currently dominates major powers’ political landscapes, accompanied by rising xenophobia and preference for strong leaders over democratic institutions. Since the 2008 financial crisis, slower democratic growth relative to China has fueled discontent, associating strong leadership with economic success. Populism scapegoats liberal globalization, intensifying xenophobia and enabling personalized rule. In a 2022 speech as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet noted declining trust in democratic institutions, with many states shifting toward non-Western systems. By 2021, International IDEA found democratic erosion in half of 173 countries, including 17 in Europe. Today, the Trump administration is often seen as semi-authoritarian.
Xenophobia appears in restrictive immigration policies and rejection of liberal norms like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In the U.S., Title 42 border restrictions persisted under Trump and Biden, reflecting populist pressures. Similarly, European leaders frequently voice immigration concerns at EU summits. At the UN, China’s defense of its policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet drew support from over 90 states, indicating waning enthusiasm for R2P among developing countries.
Economic security now holds a central strategic role, far more than during the Cold War or post-Cold War eras. The U.S. formally linked economic and national security in 2018. Secretary Blinken and Undersecretary Alan Estevez emphasized restricting China’s advanced technology access. Trump’s administration adopted even stricter measures. Increasingly, the U.S. blurs civilian and military industry lines, escalating tensions with Beijing and straining alliances.
China’s economic security concerns reach beyond the U.S. In 2023, Beijing criticized the EU’s economic security strategy. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identified supply chain vulnerabilities and imposed export controls on semiconductor equipment to China. South Korea proposed a U.S. partnership for economic security to reduce dependence on China, while India passed laws limiting Chinese investment. These developments highlight how economic security considerations now drive global competition, reshape alliances, and intensify rivalries.
Beijing’s Concern Regarding the Global Order
China alone possesses the full capacity to rival U.S. global influence and aims to shape the order to its preferences. Its economic, military, and political power, coupled with deeply held governance values, will heavily impact future order. Compared to Washington, Beijing enjoys more leadership continuity despite U.S. electoral cycles.
Beijing’s tone shifted after the Biden administration restored ties with traditional allies, partially reversing Trump’s unilateralism. In 2020, the CPC referred to a “period of strategic opportunity.” By 2022, rhetoric darkened: the BRICS Summit warned against “Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation,” the CCP’s 20th Congress denounced “hegemonic, bullying acts” and unprecedented challenges, and the 2023 Global Security Initiative Concept Paper lamented rising protectionism, persistent conflicts, and governance deficits.
By late 2023, Beijing adopted a more assertive stance emphasizing sovereignty, self-reliance, and systemic rivalry with the West. Its strategic engagement with Russia deepened, while initiatives like the Global Development Initiative extended influence in the Global South. The 2024 Two Sessions highlighted “struggle” and technological independence, and military signals escalated. By 2025, CCP messaging combined external promotion of multipolarity and institutional reform through BRICS+ and Global South forums with an internal framing of global competition as a long-term challenge demanding resilience and civilizational confidence.
China rejects Washington’s framing of a rules-based order, maintaining that international rules derive solely from the UN Charter and require consensus among all 193 member states. Foreign Minister Wang Yi affirmed “there is but one set of rules in the world.” Conversely, Beijing accuses Washington of norm erosion through interventions, sanctions, and selective international law application. China’s 2023 report “U.S. Hegemony and Its Perils” censures American strategies like “color revolutions,” bloc politics, and unilateral sanctions.
To counter perceived negative trends, Beijing introduced four initiatives: Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), Global Civilization Initiative (2023), and Global Governance Initiative (2025). Collectively, they express China’s intention to reshape the order around development, sovereignty-based security, and cultural plurality, outlining the kind of order Beijing seeks.
The Global Order Beijing Advocates
China envisions a global order distinct from U.S.-led alliances and Western universalism. It supports non-allied partnerships, plural political legitimacy, development-focused human rights, and open economic globalization.
China opposes U.S. military alliances like AUKUS and QUAD in East Asia, as well as NATO’s expanding hostility, condemning these as Cold War relics. Instead, it champions “no-alliance, no-confrontation” ties, exemplified by its relationship with Russia, which it argues avoid bloc confrontations and offer a framework for major-power relations.
China rejects universal values and insists there is no singular democracy or legitimacy standard. It emphasizes institutional competition as central and promotes multiple paths to modernization. China’s model—economic growth, social change, and technological progress under non-liberal governance—appeals to many developing states, though its relevance beyond Confucian settings is debated.
China prioritizes development over civil and political rights, arguing poverty eradication precedes other freedoms. This view resonates with many developing countries, reflected in the 2022 UN Sharm El Sheikh Implementation Plan. Beijing criticizes Western human rights discourse as interventionist and consistently invokes the UN Charter’s non-interference principle, reinforcing sovereignty as foundational.
Beijing differentiates between economic globalization, which it supports, and political democratization, which it opposes. Benefiting massively from post-Cold War market reforms, China advocates an open economic order opposing Western decoupling and protectionism. It calls on developing countries to resist “small yards and high fences” and seeks reform of international financial institutions to strengthen their influence. Premier Li Qiang reaffirmed China’s openness and pledged collaboration with the U.S. to uphold trade rules and stabilize supply chains.
Beijing’s Strategy for Shaping the Global Order
China pursues a broad strategy spanning economic, political, and security spheres, with economic influence as its strongest tool. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is central, reflecting reliance on trade and finance to boost global sway. By 2022, total BRI investment hit $962 billion, making China the leading trading partner for over 120 countries. Complementary institutions like AIIB and NDB challenge U.S.-led financial governance yet largely reproduce existing rules, as consensus-based structures restrict innovation.
China extends influence through institutions and forums it controls, often excluding U.S. involvement. It has created regional forums in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. BRICS embodies this model, with membership growing in 2023 to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the UAE. Hosting forums such as the South-South Human Rights Forum and the Central Asia-China Summit enables China to shape collective stances, emphasizing non-interference and skepticism about Western norms.
As outlined in the Global Security Initiative Concept Paper, China’s security agenda encompasses peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, mediation, regional security architectures, and nontraditional security cooperation. Its five approaches include:
Engaging in UN and other multilateral dialogues to build consensus.
Utilizing platforms like SCO, BRICS, and regional mechanisms for gradual cooperation.
Organizing high-level Global Security Initiative conferences to reinforce dialogue.
Supporting forums such as the Xiangshan Forum and China-Africa Peace and Security Forum to deepen exchanges.
Creating cooperative platforms tackling counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and emerging technologies, training 5,000 professionals from developing countries over five years.
Changes in the Coming Global Order
The upcoming decade will likely see a more fragmented and competitive global order. Though exact developments are uncertain, patterns suggest consolidation of U.S.-China bipolarity, modest ascendancy of India, and waning influence of other major powers.
By 2035, the U.S. and China will extend their lead over others. They already outpace Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, and Russia in GDP and defense spending. Digital capabilities will further cement their supremacy. The absolute gap may widen, with U.S. GDP maintaining a $10 trillion advantage over China, though China’s relative share might rise from 66% to over 70%. Despite faster growth, China confronts “triple pressures” of weak demand, supply shocks, and low confidence, limiting catch-up prospects. The U.S. is expected to retain more material resources to influence global order.
India may grow faster than Japan, Germany, the UK, France, and Russia, potentially securing the rank of the world’s third largest economy by 2027. With demographic advantages and growth momentum, India’s influence will rise but likely remain regional through 2035. Its hosting of the Global South Summit without China signals ambitions for leadership in developing states.
Germany will continue leading the EU but lack global reach. Japan’s GDP may fall behind Germany and India, with weak Beijing ties constraining influence. Brexit has diminished the UK’s European role; France remains a secondary partner to Germany. Together, these states’ global impact will decline by 2035. Russia will stay a regional player and junior partner to China. Even with a near-term end to the Ukraine war, sanctions will hamper recovery and normalization with the West. Despite resilience in sustaining a war economy, Moscow’s global sway will be reduced compared to pre-2022 levels.
Strategic Balance in Favor of the U.S.
Although many de-risk policies among major powers have benefited Washington, changes are mounting in 2025. In the 2010s, states hedged bets—seeking economic gains from China while relying on U.S. security. However, since 2018, with Washington designating “economic security” as vital, major economies have lessened dependence on China and strengthened ties with the U.S. This shift, reinforced by corporate “China+1” strategies, unsettles earlier balances. Trump’s tariffs and the Ukraine war are expected to tilt the strategic scale toward China over the next decade.
By 2035, Washington might strengthen its lead by extending alliances into economic and technological realms. The U.S.-South Korea partnership was broadened in 2023 to include economic goals; Vietnam elevated ties with the U.S. to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Additionally, the U.S. and EU launched plans for a Europe-Middle East-India corridor to counter China’s BRI. Nevertheless, persistent U.S. tariffs on steel, aluminum, and Chinese goods complicate trade diplomacy and strain key ties, raising doubts about Washington’s long-term economic reliability. These frictions somewhat undermine U.S.-led efforts, causing some allies to hedge between economic blocs. Despite this, China’s challenges persist—it remains non-aligned, lacks formal allies, and cannot replicate Washington’s “small yard, high fence” digital strategy. However, Trump’s reductions in U.S. ally protections have lessened this dynamic.
The Ukraine war has entrenched Western dependence on the U.S. and heightened suspicion of Beijing, which refrains from condemning Moscow. Regardless of the war’s duration, China’s close ties to Russia will obstruct relations with most European nations, pushing them closer to Washington in global disputes.
Beijing’s partnerships with developing states remain uncertain. Russia may be its only substantial but not allied partner. Relations with Brazil depend on Lula’s leadership, while ties with India are constrained by India’s QUAD membership and growing rivalry. India’s economic growth and Global South leadership will intensify its competition with China for influence among developing countries.
Continued World Peace with Historical Regression
Competition between China and the U.S. will escalate, likely causing more security conflicts. Global order depends on public goods—security and stability—provided by leading powers. Yet both regard the other as their main strategic threat, decreasing cooperation odds. Washington sees Beijing aiming to reshape the order to its benefit; Beijing criticizes U.S. interference in Taiwan, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and maritime disputes. As Chinese officials note, “the world is not peaceful.”
Despite increasing tension, a direct war between the two remains improbable. Beyond Taiwan, no conflict presently risks direct military confrontation. Beijing exhibits little desire for military regime change abroad, differing from Washington. Coexistence remains feasible, suggesting relative peace over the next decade.
However, peace will come with setbacks. Globalization is giving way to counter-globalization, with governance rhetoric lacking substantive action. Technological and economic development will continue but order will grow less stable and less predictable. Proxy conflicts will persist, and AI-driven unmanned weapons may lower military casualties but increase civilian deaths, encouraging more attacks. Regression will manifest as more frequent military clashes, diplomatic conflicts, economic retrenchment, and technological fragmentation.
Historically, global orders have lasted decades: the interwar period about 20 years, the Cold War roughly 40. If this pattern holds, regression may persist a decade or two, possibly even three. Counter-globalization remains nascent and unlikely to peak before the next decade ends. Those expecting a short disruption will likely be disappointed.
Political Uncertainty and Conflicts over Economic Security
Populism is projected to become the dominant global ideology over the next decade, shaping foreign policies among major powers. While popular now but not at its height, populism is expected to spread rapidly, bolstering itself through foreign policy and resisting any revival of liberal global order. Populist leaders prioritize regime and economic security, heightening uncertainty, weakening liberal norms, and fueling international conflict.
More countries will be governed by populists. In non-Western regions, many leaders have entrenched constitutional authority for extended rule. In the West, populist parties—such as the Republican Party under Trump in the U.S., Germany’s AfD, Sweden Democrats, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Northern League—are rising or already in power. By the late 2020s, Western legislatures or governments may be dominated by populists. Given current trends, the U.S. could shift from democracy to a semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian model, with populism supplanting liberalism and steering foreign policy toward protectionism and disregard for humanitarian principles.
Populist leaders’ emphasis on regime security leads to aggressive, unpredictable foreign stances aimed at domestic political consolidation. Regime security, unlike national security, reflects unstable internal politics. This volatility drives erratic foreign policy, erodes international norms, and raises global instability. Chaos may define the emerging order.
“Economic security” rhetoric will intensify xenophobia. Populists scapegoat foreign actors for domestic failures, stoking resentment nationally and internationally. Social media accelerates xenophobic messaging, intertwined with economic anxieties. Leaders invoke economic security to justify de-globalization measures—delinking, de-risking, sanctions, and protectionism. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, enacted under Biden in 2022, exemplifies this departure from free-market principles toward industrial protectionism. Other powers adopt similar policies, reinforcing populist values and hastening the liberal order’s decline during Trump 2.0.
The historical arc of global order from the mid-20th century reveals distinct phases: ideological contest during the Cold War, globalization and liberal expansion post-Cold War, and the current counter-globalization era marked by fragmentation, populism, and economic security. Each era is defined by dominant values, norms, and institutional power distribution: ideological expansion and proxy wars, democratization and market reforms, and now deglobalization, technological rivalry, and sovereignty reassertion.
Looking ahead, U.S.-China bipolarity consolidation will dominate the coming decade. Washington will maintain superior material resources and broader alliances, while Beijing will rely on economic globalization and strategic non-alignment. India’s rapid growth may place it third globally, but its influence will be regional. Europe’s major powers will see declining roles, and Russia will remain constrained by sanctions and junior to China. The strategic balance will increasingly favor China, with U.S. dominance waning.
This balance will not bring stability. Populism is set to become the most influential ideology among major powers, eroding liberal norms and pushing unpredictable foreign policies. Economic security will supplant free-market doctrine, legitimizing protectionism and fueling xenophobia. Governance will stagnate, international institutions weaken, and selective norm enforcement deepen mistrust.
The paradox of the next decade is that relative peace may persist even as regression dominates. Direct U.S.-China war appears unlikely, but proxy conflicts, technological bifurcation, and diplomatic clashes will multiply. Advances in AI and unmanned weapons may lower military casualties but drive up civilian deaths further undermining the ethics of warfare.
History suggests this rollback of globalization will last well beyond a decade, potentially extending for decades. Far from a brief disturbance, it signals a prolonged era defined by volatility, fragmentation, and populist dominance at liberalism’s expense.
The current order neither repeats the Cold War nor continues the liberal post-Cold War pattern. It represents a counter-globalization order—characterized by rivalry without ideological contest, partial deglobalization without full decoupling, and peace without genuine progress.
Original article: cirsd.org/horizon-article
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