The antiwar, libertarian author sat down with The American Conservative to discuss Tehran’s nuclear program and the misinformation surrounding it.
Scott Horton met with The American Conservative’s Harrison Berger to explore the dynamics behind the U.S. tensions with Iran. The conversation centered on the legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear activities, the credibility of intelligence on weaponization allegations, and the breakdown of the 2015 JCPOA deal. Horton highlights how successive U.S. governments, under persistent Israeli influence, have portrayed Iran’s uranium enrichment as a casus belli, even though Iran remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and multiple U.S. intelligence reports have found no evidence of an active nuclear arms program.
It was reported that Trump has given the Iranian authorities an ultimatum. They have to not only end their nuclear program, but must also stop producing missiles that can reach Israel, and end support for what are called these “Iranian proxy groups,” like Hezbollah and the Houthis. We’re always told that Iran or Russia—or whichever country that the hawks want to send us into war with at the moment—that they’re always the most intractable enemy, they just can’t be negotiated with. But it seems like the side that is impossible to negotiate with, at least in this case, is the United States, who keeps shifting these terms at Israel’s behest and demanding that Iran accept terms that we already know are unacceptable to that country. Is that incorrect?
That perspective aligns with mine. A useful historical comparison is the Rambouillet Accord, where Madeleine Albright presented Slobodan Milosevic with an ultimatum ahead of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. The deal was essentially designed to be refused. Similarly, these current demands—including, notably, the missile restrictions—are simply unrealistic. Insisting that Iran halt support for groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis while completely abandoning its nuclear program contradicts the Ayatollah’s unwavering stance since 2006. Iran sees mastering the nuclear fuel cycle as a sovereign right and a matter of national pride.
Regarding missile capabilities, it’s unreasonable to expect a nation not to maintain deterrence against countries threatening it. Demands that Iran eliminate missile ranges capable of reaching Israel do not withstand scrutiny. Unlike 2003, when false claims were constructed with more elaborate justifications such as the Colin Powell presentation, the current focus on Iran’s conventional missiles doesn’t even constitute a convincing pretext for conflict.
I want to ask you and redirect back to the Iran nuclear program because there has been this propaganda campaign around it for many years, going back at least three decades, to try to convince Americans that Iran’s civilian nuclear program is actually a very dangerous weapon and that it’s a threat not just to Israel but to us here in the United States. You are probably one of the only people who has this kind of encyclopedic knowledge about that topic, not just the politics but also some of the nuclear science involved. Can you take some time to explain how that propaganda campaign has evolved and why it makes no sense?
This is indeed a vast topic. To begin with, Iran has been party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1968. Under that treaty, Iran is subject to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the authority to examine any facility where nuclear material is processed, ensuring that declared materials are not diverted for military use. This safeguard agreement applies to all non-nuclear weapon states who acceded to the NPT.
Efforts to develop nuclear reactors began during the Shah’s regime in the 1970s but stalled after the 1979 revolution, resuming only this century. Iran lacked indigenous fuel sources until it established the Natanz enrichment site in 2005-2006, acquiring uranium and related technology illicitly from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network.
In the 1990s, Iran attempted to purchase a light water reactor from China. Such reactors cannot yield weapons-grade plutonium because the spent fuel contains isotopes too contaminated for weapons use. The Clinton administration intervened to halt this sale. Consequently, Iran opted to build heavy water reactors, capable of producing plutonium that could potentially be reprocessed into weapons fuel—exemplifying, perhaps ironically, the counterproductive impact of U.S. interference.
Natanz opened in 2006, where uranium ore is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and spun in centrifuges to separate uranium-235 from uranium-238. Enrichment levels of around 3.6% suffice for power generation, 20% for medical isotopes used in cancer treatment, while 90% enrichment qualifies as weapons-grade uranium. Iran’s 60% enrichment was essentially a bargaining tactic.
The NPT permits peaceful nuclear technology development, which includes mastering the entire fuel cycle. American hawks, especially those influenced by Likud, find this intolerable—a stance driven by Tel Aviv policy rather than Washington’s.
The Ayatollah appears to have engineered a strategic bluff: a latent nuclear deterrent, not an outright atomic bomb, but the capability to develop one. Similar positions are maintained by countries like Brazil, Germany, and Japan—nuclear threshold states without immediate existential threats.
From Israel’s viewpoint, any enrichment is unacceptable. This has led to sabotage attempts, assassination of scientists, and relentless pressure on the U.S. Leaders from George W. Bush through Joe Biden vowed to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear arms.
In 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate concluded Iran had halted bomb design activities. Allegations of clandestine weapons programs were never substantiated. The infamous “smoking laptop” was exposed as an Israeli forgery funneled through the MEK. Claims about warheads and green salt collapsed under scrutiny.
Obama’s JCPOA aimed to avert war: Iran ceased heavy-water reactor construction, reduced centrifuge operations at Natanz, repurposed Fordow for research instead of production, and allowed intensified inspections surpassing any other country’s with the IAEA. In return, sanctions were supposed to ease, but largely remained enforced.
Trump abandoned the agreement in 2018, influenced by Netanyahu, reinstating harsh sanctions. Biden maintained that stance. By last June, Trump equated enrichment with weaponization and authorized strikes on Fordow and Natanz. Available information indicates Fordow and Natanz have been disabled, and the Isfahan conversion facility destroyed.
Iran has reiterated its refusal to develop nuclear weapons, a stance consistent since 1968. Whether they will halt enrichment remains uncertain; notions of honor and sovereignty strongly influence such decisions.
What do you think we should expect from the new talks between the U.S. and Iran?
I’m unsure if Trump’s intention is to offer an impossible deal or to create an exit route. My guess favors the former, but certainty eludes me.
He referenced Operation Eagle Claw—the failed rescue mission under Jimmy Carter—and spoke of risking similar failure when deploying Delta Force to apprehend Maduro. This shows he harbors some awareness of possible consequences.
Launching an unprovoked regime-change war with its unpredictable commitments would be reckless. That consideration stands as the strongest deterrent. There is no good reason for such conflict, and numerous reasons caution against it.
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
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