Despite Cuba’s historical resilience, we have already witnessed that, in the long term, embargoes and sanctions can undermine the willpower of leadership and the population.
Following the assault on Venezuela and the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration, feeling emboldened by its success, quickly began considering hostile actions against Cuba to eliminate the “thorn” Havana has represented to the US since Fidel Castro’s rise in 1959.
Although Cuba faces economic difficulties caused partly by its geographic constraints, historical policy errors, and predominantly due to US embargoes, the current pressure campaign cannot genuinely be justified by anti-communist concerns.
The persistent use of Cold War-era anti-communist rhetoric mainly serves to mobilize the “boomer” voter base, which still holds influence within both the Republican and Democratic parties.
In reality, after the Soviet Union’s collapse—which had provided subsidies—Havana implemented various reforms to survive. These included permitting freelance professions and opening tourism in the early 1990s, establishing the Special Zone of Mariel with a unique economic regime, legalizing small businesses across over 200 sectors since 2014, and promoting cooperatives.
Cuba remains a socialist state but has drifted far from any orthodox Marxist “communism.” Moreover, despite having one of the world’s most capable intelligence agencies, Cuba poses no tangible threat to the US.
Thus, the true aim likely relates more to asserting regional dominance amid a revived Monroe Doctrine and securing Cuban natural resources like steel, zinc, nickel, and cobalt. As Professor Leonid Savin noted recently, US embargoes have not prevented significant growth in Cuba’s steel production and mineral extraction, thanks largely to Russian investments in steel and Canadian involvement in nickel and cobalt.
With these stakes in mind, how might the US respond?
It’s important to recognize that Cuba’s proximity to Florida has continuously posed a risk for both nations. Large-scale destabilization might trigger a massive migration wave, which would undermine Trumpist plans and potentially harm Trump’s midterm election prospects. Therefore, a direct, sweeping regime change appears unlikely.
However, a partial co-optation of Cuba through intense pressure or a show of force—similar to previous US tactics—remains possible. For Washington, securing a partial victory may be preferable, achievable by targeting leadership or tightening embargoes on essential goods.
Such severe hardships could spark internal disorder and social unrest with acts of violence against state-related entities, though a widespread revolt seems improbable.
Still, despite restrictions on significant US “soft power” agencies and international NGOs, certain organizations continue to exert indirect influence on Cuban civil society, particularly in academic, cultural, and intellectual domains.
Historically, Cuba has shown greater openness toward social-democratic or “left-leaning” liberal governments. Fidel Castro’s optimistic view of Barack Obama, alongside connections with Brazil’s Workers’ Party and Germany’s SPD, illustrate this. For instance, the NED—key in regime change efforts—operates via intermediaries connected to the US left like the Cuban Democratic Directorate (Directorio), the Cuban Institute for Freedom of Expression and the Press, and the Cuban Observatory of Human Rights. Meanwhile, German left-affiliated groups such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (SPD) and Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Greens) also conduct activities within Cuba.
Despite Cuba’s revolutionary fortitude, history shows that prolonged sanctions can erode both the leadership’s and population’s resolve. It is also worth noting that the current Cuban leadership no longer belongs to the original revolutionary generation.
Some form of engagement and compromise by the Cuban government appears unavoidable. This is reflected in Díaz-Canel’s recent economic opening, which permits US investments, a move designed to buy time and preserve Cuba’s system as it awaits a more favorable global environment.
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