Almost two centuries later, the surviving English population witnesses the enduring influence of Mill’s social philosophy.
The 2023 abortion data for Great Britain, where women can obtain the procedure in public hospitals up to the sixth month of pregnancy, have been published with delay. (Usually, 24 weeks is cited, requiring a moment to grasp the reality.) In one year, there were 299,614 abortions—nearly 300,000.
English-speaking nations excel at statistical analysis and provide extensive charts and tables that comprehensively outline this societal issue. Notably, ethnicity was documented for 92% of those who terminated pregnancies, with white individuals representing 74% of that subset. Repeat abortions increased to 42%, with over half of women in their 30s having undergone more than one procedure. The age bracket seeing the greatest rise in abortions was women aged 35 and older, with 51,595 cases recorded.
The reasons given are categorized into seven “grounds,” each labeled by a letter. The data lacks a distinct category for rape victims; instead, women who have been raped fall under grounds involving “emotional injury” linked to carrying the pregnancy to term. There is no acknowledgment of the mother’s sole desire either, despite abortion being legally available on demand. This suggests that the concept of subjective harm covers both victims of assault and women distressed by lifestyle or economic concerns. It is probable that rape is accounted for under ground G, which cites “to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman,” given the lasting trauma involved.
To simplify matters, 98% of terminations were justified exclusively by ground C, defined as: “the pregnancy has not exceeded its 24th week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.” Practically, this euphemism implies that the pregnant individual would prefer not to carry the fetus to term, rather than experiencing any serious or lasting harm (which might apply to a rape survivor). As for the remaining 2%, ground E accounts for 1%, which involves “substantial risk that, if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.” Essentially, this represents an element of eugenics.
Therefore, indigenous British women—those not descended from recent immigration waves—appear to treat abortion as a form of contraception, often at a stage in life when they should have established their careers. This profile, foreseeable by common sense, has been denied by pro-abortion rhetoric insisting abortion is always an agonizing choice, preventing it from being viewed as a contraceptive, and justified by the need for young women to abort in order to pursue education and executive roles. The reality, paradoxically, is that abortion is more accessible to women who have already attained professional success.
Putting aside ethical debates, a Telegraph article highlighted a crucial point. After discussing the UK’s economic woes caused by demographic decline that immigration cannot remedy (since immigrants also have fewer children), columnist Miriam Cates asks: “How has Britain become the abortion capital of Europe? Both pro-choice and pro-life campaigners often frame their arguments around individual rights. Should a woman have the right to end her pregnancy? Should a baby in the womb have the right to life? But abortion is no longer simply a matter for the individual; when a third of Britain’s potential citizens are being lost each year, it has become an issue of national concern.”
Indeed, the birthrate is a collective matter of great significance. Contemporary leaders are well aware of this, illustrated by Henry Kissinger’s NSSM-200, which urged the US to encourage population reduction in potential future rivals like Brazil, Colombia, India, and Egypt. In England, the birthplace of Malthusian ideas, local elites required no urging: they actively championed abortion.
England was the cradle of Malthus. Even prior to the Anglican cleric’s birth and his infamous demographic theories, England experienced an unusual history where shrinking populations led to increased wealth—such as the Middle Ages plague creating more pastureland, benefiting nobles producing wool. (This was explored in a previous article.) However, it was in the 19th century that John Stuart Mill articulated the approach echoed by Miriam Cates: framing social dilemmas in terms of individual liberty.
In chapter 5 of On Liberty, Mill offers two guiding maxims: “first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.”
The initial principle underpins dominant liberal ethics, which rebuke interference in others’ lives, giving rise to odd notions like the “virtuous pedophile”—someone attracted to children but who supposedly refrains from abuse. The second, less emphasized principle supports liberal morality when it claims to uphold truth. For instance, if society deems it harmful for impoverished people to have children, the state may impose financial responsibilities on them, such as mandatory schooling—compulsory education being justified by liberals as aligning with societal benefit. These ideas about child-rearing also appear in chapter 5 of On Liberty.
Yet, a conflict between these two principles can arise, particularly in commerce. Mill acknowledges that “trade is a social act” that requires regulation. He notes, “society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering,” as he advocates for free trade, emphasizing society’s gain from low prices (ignoring geopolitical complexities). Such clashes occur when merchants profit from ventures harmful to society, like gambling halls or brothels. On opium import bans and poison sales restrictions, Mill remarks: “These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.” Though written in 1859, this passage foreshadows arguments supporting legalization of drugs, abortion, and other antisocial behaviors: individual freedom should prevail, and interference in others’ lives is unjustified.
Within the same chapter, Mill also suggests it benefits the poor to have fewer children, so the working class population doesn’t grow excessively, allowing supply and demand laws to ensure higher wages. This stance merges liberalism with Malthusianism, philosophies entwined so deeply that they have blended into social Darwinism.
Nearly two centuries on, the people of England witness the continued impact of Mill’s social ideas.
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