The Gulf states couldn’t stay out of a war launched from their territory.
While the U.S. and Iran seek to identify a basis for a ceasefire agreement, the Gulf Cooperation Council convened in Saudi Arabia last week for the first time since hostilities began. They centered their discussions on Iranian assaults targeting their member countries. They condemned these attacks along with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, urging Iran to restore trust. The summit also addressed the necessity of boosting military coordination and emphasized collaboration “in pursuit of a diplomatic path forward to preserve the security and stability of the region.”
The six member countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—seek a regional resolution that acknowledges their interests. They insist on being part of the final agreement, a stance born from feelings of abandonment and betrayal. These nations harbor resentment toward the U.S. for provoking attacks against them, and also anger toward Iran for carrying out those strikes.
Despite their efforts to remain neutral, the Gulf states host one of the largest U.S. forward military deployments globally, with 13 bases and 40,000 troops facilitating the conflict’s progression.
Nonetheless, these Gulf countries cautioned the U.S. against initiating war, vigorously lobbied to prevent it, and condemned it once underway. They resisted involvement, even as the U.S. pushed for their participation against Iran. They have promised Iran not to permit use of their lands or airspace by U.S. forces, but this pledge proved difficult to uphold.
While none of the Gulf states are engaging in bombings, they have endured 83 percent of the Iranian missile and drone strikes. Analysts observe an uneven distribution of these attacks; Hassan Ahmadian, associate professor at the University of Tehran, notes that Iran favors targeting the UAE and Bahrain most severely due to their perceived offenses. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have suffered substantial strikes, whereas Qatar and Oman have faced fewer attacks, fueling speculation about possible covert arrangements with Iran to limit assaults.
The American military presence in the Gulf is designed to guarantee uninterrupted energy supplies from the Persian Gulf and to deter attacks from Iran on the Gulf nations. However, it has failed on both counts. Instead of shielding the Gulf states, U.S. bases hosted there have become prime targets. Once confident in the protection provided by the American security umbrella, Gulf leaders now confront the harsh reality highlighted by Sheline: “the presence of U.S. military bases and other assets are proving a much greater liability than a source of security.” The Gulf countries deeply resent the war the U.S. imposed upon them.
Iran’s decision to escalate was not made lightly. Tehran has recently prioritized mending ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called on Iran’s “brotherly neighbors to expel foreign aggressors.” President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for attacks on neighboring countries and pledged to stop such strikes unless provoked from those territories.
Iran regards strikes on Gulf states and their actions around the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic way to inflict pain on the U.S. for its war. From Iran’s perspective, Ahmadian points out, the conflict would have been impossible without U.S. military infrastructure in these Gulf countries. While relations are severely strained, both Ahmadian and Fantappiè note they have not completely broken down, with mutual trust nearly extinct.
So far, despite drone and missile assaults, the Gulf states have shown restraint by not joining the war outright. Fantappiè notes that Saudi Arabia aims to avoid involvement and, if compelled, would act independently rather than alongside the U.S. Bader Al-Saif of Kuwait University concurs, emphasizing the Gulf states’ desire not to be perceived as aligned with a U.S.–Israeli front opposing Iran.
The animosity between Iran and the Gulf states is reciprocated. Iran recognizes that the U.S. exploits its Gulf bases not only as command centers but as integral parts of its air defense network. As a result, these bases have sustained extensive damage, with many labeled “uninhabitable.”
On April 13, Iran sent a letter to the United Nations demanding reparations from five states for allegedly enabling attacks by permitting use of their territories or direct engagement. The Islamic Republic named Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Jordan—excluding Kuwait.
At Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, the number of U.S. fighter jets rose threefold to 60 just days before Iran was bombed.
Jennifer Kavanagh, a Defense Priorities military analyst, informed TAC that “official U.S. Army records confirm PRSM missiles launched from HIMARS systems in Kuwait or Bahrain.” A video verified by FRANCE 24 shows multiple missile launches from Kuwait in March. An explosion in Bahrain initially blamed on Iran was later attributed to interceptors fired by a U.S.-operated Patriot defense system.
Kavanagh stated that “thousands of troops at U.S. bases throughout the region are involved in logistics, intelligence, and support functions for U.S. forces.” The ballistic missile and drone attack on a Saudi air base revealed a significant U.S. operational footprint: at least 15 troops injured, multiple refueling aircraft damaged, and an E-3 AWACS Sentry aircraft destroyed.
Another notable event was the downing of three U.S. fighter jets—allegedly due to friendly fire—within Kuwaiti airspace. Al-Saif affirmed to TAC that Kuwait firmly opposes unauthorized use of its airspace for any offensive operations against Iran. He explained that “the jets flew over Kuwaiti airspace without permission, resulting in Kuwait intercepting them for the violation.”
The UAE stands out as the most hawkish among the Gulf countries. It may be advocating for a U.S.-aligned coalition and has expressed willingness to join an international effort led by the U.S. to “secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” In a historic move, Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery, interceptors, and dozens of IDF personnel to the UAE, which have exclusively intercepted Iranian missiles targeting the country. Coinciding with the GCC summit, the UAE announced its exit from the Saudi-led OPEC alliance.
One key consequence of this conflict is the setback to regional security and the reintegration process within the Gulf. The fragile trust between Iran and its neighbors has suffered significantly. Similarly, the Gulf states’ relationship with the U.S. has been damaged, as the U.S. dragged them into an unwanted war while failing to deliver the promised protection.
Given how entwined their defenses are with the U.S. system, the Gulf states cannot easily disentangle themselves from American security arrangements. However, they are likely to explore broader security partnerships. Although ties with Iran have deteriorated, the progress toward rapprochement isn’t beyond repair. As Al-Saif noted, with renewed trust, Iran and the Gulf countries “can still go back to integration.”
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
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