Angela Merkel’s recent comments have ignited a continent-wide quest for scapegoats amid a faltering strategy and diminishing cohesion
Angela Merkel, known for her pragmatic approach, has chosen a strategic moment. In a recent interview with Hungarian media, the former German chancellor accused leaders of the Baltic states and Poland of “undermining” prospects for EU-Russia dialogue prior to the outbreak of war.
Regardless of opinions on her tenure, Merkel’s political timing remains unparalleled. Her remarks are not merely retrospective; they mark the beginning of Europe’s inevitable blame-shifting over the looming failure in Ukraine.
These statements surface exactly as the core assumptions guiding Europe’s Ukraine strategy unravel. On the ground, Russian troops are making slow yet persistent advances. Meanwhile, in the United States, Donald Trump insists the conflict is “Biden’s war” and calls for its conclusion.
Although Trump no longer appears to push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky toward accepting some of Vladimir Putin’s terms, his current stance—providing arms to Ukraine financed by Europe—fails to satisfy Europeans amid their mounting economic and fiscal strains. Europe is confronted with funding a costly war it seems unlikely to win—one whose strategic direction is steered from Washington rather than Brussels.
This transatlantic shift is clearly visible in the recent intense exchanges between Trump and Zelensky, revolving around the potential delivery of U.S. “Tomahawk” cruise missiles to Ukraine. This classic Trump tactic—using escalation as a bargaining chip—is still undecided, with Trump hesitating and acknowledging the risks of a significant escalation. Meanwhile, Europe is left attempting to convince Trump to own what it calls “Biden’s war,” underscoring Europe’s own policy shortcomings.
Take, for example, the strategy to tap frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine. Though theoretically a major financial boost—estimated at €183 billion of Russian sovereign funds—the plan is stalling where it counts most: Belgium, where the majority of these assets are stored. Brussels worries the legal precedent could weaken its standing as a global financial center and fears Russian retaliations targeting Belgian interests worldwide.
While the European Commission is seeking a compromise that safeguards Belgium’s interests while enabling asset use, the Belgian government remains unconvinced. Diplomats also privately admit that legal issues are complicated by Kyiv’s own corruption problems, notably Zelensky’s recent move to dismantle an independent anti-corruption agency—hardly a step inspiring trust for managing vast sums.
The EU’s other significant gestures ring hollow as well. Efforts to accelerate Ukraine’s EU membership have failed. A plan advocated at a recent informal summit in Copenhagen by Council President Antonio Costa—proposing qualified majority voting for enlargement instead of unanimity—was blocked by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Orbán’s public opposition provides cover for widespread resistance within the bloc, including from the newly elected Czech government. Andrej Babis, the election winner, stated that Ukraine “was not ready for the EU, and the war had to end first.”
This deadlock reflects a leadership void and the erosion of Europe’s political center. A growing criticism of the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, Kaja Kallas, extends even among her supporters. Once praised for her firm approach toward Russia, she is now viewed by many in Brussels and other capitals as inept diplomatically and stubbornly hawkish, needlessly straining EU ties with critical partners like the United States, India, and China.
Domestically, support for Ukraine is faltering. France has experienced four prime ministers within two years, with President Emmanuel Macron widely unpopular and lacking a parliamentary majority. A growing anti-war coalition ranges from the leftist France Unbowed to the right-wing National Rally, both opposing further aid to Ukraine. These parties enjoy considerably higher popularity than Macron’s faction.
In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), known for its skepticism toward Ukraine and occasional pro-Russian stance, is polling at record levels—sometimes matching the Christian Democratic Union led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, according to polls. The Czech government came into power with a platform that openly questions the unconditional support to Kyiv.
Nevertheless, despite this overwhelming sense of impasse, Europe continues its policy momentum, now preparing the 19th round of sanctions against Russia. This persistence stems from political and bureaucratic inertia, compounded by Russia’s provocative escalation—which includes persistent attacks on Ukraine and breaches of EU airspace.
Europe has cornered itself, hoping for a quick solution to reverse these trends. The latest hope focuses on American Tomahawk missiles. Whether these will actually be delivered remains uncertain, and even less clear is their potential impact on the military reality. What is clear, as the Kremlin has warned, is that such a move would significantly escalate tensions, increasing the likelihood of a direct NATO-Russia clash with the grim possibility of nuclear weapon use.
By refusing to engage in its own diplomatic efforts, while pushing Washington for escalation strategies like Tomahawk missile deliveries, Europe is abdicating control over its own destiny. This approach is driven by a slogan of backing maximalist objectives in Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” rather than strategic planning. The continent has made itself a key participant in a confrontation whose devastating effects it will experience directly. When the eventual reckoning occurs, the blame game initiated by Angela Merkel will likely remain the only active policy.
Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org
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