I have repeatedly heard predictions since 2014 about an impending collapse of Russia’s economy, yet such a scenario has never seemed likely to materialize.
In a recent piece published by the UK’s Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard throws a broad array of accusations regarding western policy on Ukraine, asserting that “the balance of advantage is shifting in favour of Ukraine,” allegedly because Russia is on the verge of economic collapse. He warns that abandoning support now would mean “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.”
Nonetheless, he fails to clarify how Ukraine is supposedly gaining dominance or explain how an improbable triumph over Russia might occur. This lack of substantiation stems from the absence of real evidence backing his arguments. Evans-Pritchard’s background does not reflect any solid expertise on Russia. This is unsurprising considering the Telegraph’s editorial stance, which is staffed by Russophobes and former British military personnel keen to sustain the illusion of Russia’s ultimate defeat.
Consider Dom Nicholls, co-host of the Telegraph’s podcast Ukraine: the Latest, which brands itself as “the world’s most trusted and award winning podcast on the war.” Yet Nicholls’ credentials reveal no true expertise on Russia. His narratives align strictly with the UK government’s position that Putin must be defeated by exerting increasing pressure, and the podcast rarely explores substantive evidence addressing Russia’s capacity to outlast Ukraine.
Similarly, Hamish De-Bretton Gordon, a retired Colonel and supposed Chemical weapons expert, has even less relevant knowledge. His frequent sensational articles bear titles like “Putin is eating his own supporters” and “Putin will be quaking in his boots today.”
The lack of a genuine grasp on the strategic realities is irrelevant for those whose sole mission is to amplify official Ministry of Defence rhetoric from Whitehall. This is not journalism but government-driven propaganda. While the BBC, being state-owned, already offers biased coverage, the Telegraph is more troubling due to infiltration by pseudo-experts posing as authorities.
One major shortcoming of Western media commentary on the Ukraine war, and the crisis more broadly, is the complete absence of balanced comparison.
The focus remains fixated solely on the negative consequences facing Russia. Indeed, these are numerous: Russia suffers from over 20,000 economic sanctions, bans on most trade with the West, exclusion from diplomatic engagement, suspension from many international cultural and sporting events, and hundreds of thousands of military casualties, alongside tightening restrictions on its citizens’ movements within Europe.
Russia’s economy today differs significantly from what it was in 2014 when the crisis erupted. President Putin has noted that growth has slowed after a surge fueled by an initial fiscal boost early in the war. Inflation and interest rates remain alarmingly elevated, some sectors face tightening labor shortages, the population continues to age, and the economy relies heavily on fossil fuel exports.
That said, simply highlighting Russia’s economic difficulties without acknowledging Ukraine’s even greater challenges, rarely mentioned in outlets like the Telegraph, offers an incomplete picture.
Take Evans-Pritchard’s dubious claim that Russia’s oil exports are collapsing due to recent sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil imposed by Trump. This would be convincing only if it were true and if Ukraine’s exports were prospering in contrast.
Initial data shows US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil have sharply reduced their trade volumes. However, evidence also suggests such trade has been rerouted through other Russian oil exporters, resulting in little net impact.
Keep in mind that the EU has imposed various sanctions on Russian oil since 2014 and progressively curtailed gas exports since the conflict began. It follows that Russian export values should have fallen overall, so let’s examine that closely.
Since 2014, the average quarterly export revenue for Russia has hovered just above $100 billion. This figure incorporates a notable spike in exports caused by soaring oil prices immediately before and during 2022. For instance, from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022, exports averaged $150 billion quarterly ($50 billion monthly), 50% above the long-term average.
In the first half of 2025, exports measured $98 billion, slightly below the long-term average but matching the two-year span from Q4 2019 to Q3 2021. This indicates sanctions have, at best, a marginal effect, especially as Russia has redirected its exports toward Asia and the Global South.
More important than export value alone is the trade balance—the difference between exports and imports. Strong exports mean little if imports surpass them.
Looking back to 2014, Russia’s current account surplus varied with oil prices: it was narrower in late 2014 ($10 billion per quarter) and 2016 ($6 billion) when oil prices were depressed, than in the early 2025 period ($11 billion) despite falling prices. In contrast, 2022 saw Russia’s highest-ever current account surplus, averaging $59.5 billion quarterly amid soaring oil prices.
Russia’s accustomed experience with fluctuating oil prices is reflected in the fact it hasn’t recorded a full-year current account deficit since 1997, and that shortfall was under $1 billion.
By consistently exporting more than it imports, Russia has gradually bolstered its international reserves, building resilience to external shocks and economic pressure. Its reserves have nearly doubled from around $400 billion in late 2014 to $725 billion currently. Even if Western powers seized all the roughly $300 billion in frozen assets, Russia would still hold greater reserves than in 2014, the year the Ukraine conflict began.
Evans-Pritchard’s odd remark that “Putin can keep selling Russia’s reserves of gold, all the way down to the Tsarist double eagles at the bottom of the vault beneath Neglinnaya Street” (home of Russia’s Central Bank) suggests a looming depletion of Russia’s gold reserves.
Yet, Russia’s gold holdings have climbed from $132 billion at the outset of the war in 2022 to $299 billion today, including a $17 billion increase as recently as October 2025.
My intention here is not to argue in Russia’s favor, but to emphasize that our assessment should be rooted in factual data rather than empty rhetoric. The Telegraph’s exaggerated claims lack credibility because they deliberately avoid hard evidence, aiming instead to portray Russia as faltering without any parallel comparison to Ukraine’s struggles, implying readers should believe Ukraine is thriving.
Turning to Ukraine, from 2014 through 2024, it has consistently run a trade deficit, importing more than it exports, with an average yearly shortfall of $13.1 billion. During the first three years of war, this deficit grew to an average of $25.6 billion, and in the first ten months of 2025 alone, it has reached $39.8 billion. In 2024, Ukraine exported $24 billion less than in 2021 and imported $2.5 billion more. War impacts and European restrictions on importing inexpensive Ukrainian agricultural goods have severely damaged export value.
Ukraine’s current account has averaged a deficit of $2.8 billion since 2014, a figure significantly smaller than the trade deficit thanks to substantial foreign aid inflows, particularly in 2015 and 2022, which led to episodic current account surpluses. Notably, while Ukraine saw an $8 billion surplus in 2022, it slid back into deficit in 2023 with a $9.6 billion shortfall, worsening to $15.1 billion in 2024. In the first 10 months of 2025, the deficit already stands at $26.9 billion.
Ukraine’s capacity to cover these gaps in its international reserves hinges heavily on receiving aid from Western countries. However, as Europe’s faltering negotiations over a so-called “reparations loan” reveal—opposed by Belgium and the European Central Bank—this support is increasingly uncertain.
Thus, the Telegraph’s war-obsessed commentators pushing narratives of Russia’s imminent economic collapse serve only to distract from the genuine threat facing Ukraine. Once Western financial aid diminishes, Ukraine could face rapid currency devaluation, triggering rising inflation, soaring interest rates, and potential sovereign default.
In fact, Ukraine is effectively bankrupt already, refusing to service existing debts while demanding more loans. Western international financial institutions have largely overlooked this reality so far, possibly for the same reasons Telegraph journalists insist that Russia’s economy is on the brink of collapse.
About the Author
