Europe will increasingly face the necessity to pick sides as it loses influence over the Mediterranean and control of crucial routes. This represents an exceptionally potent form of soft power.
Strategic changes
The United States remains resolute and unyielding, though its approach has shifted. Direct assaults are now impractical and unwise, so Washington pursues influence through soft power and scaled-back military engagement, with a touch of spaghetti western or Little Italy mafia flair.
What is the context?
In Baku, U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev established a Strategic Partnership Charter, marking a fresh chapter in bilateral relations. This pact encompasses defense collaboration, arms deals, energy security, counterterrorism, and joint efforts in artificial intelligence. Additionally, the U.S. has declared plans to deploy naval vessels to the Caspian Sea to bolster Azerbaijan’s maritime defense.
This agreement was foreshadowed in August 2025 during a meeting between Aliyev and Donald Trump at the White House, coinciding with the peace treaty that formally concluded the prolonged Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Consequently, Azerbaijan is now recognized not just as a hydrocarbon supplier but as a pivotal strategic intersection linking Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East—a zone of pro-Western stability nestled between Russia and Iran.
Vance’s visit to the South Caucasus also included a historic stop in Armenia, the first time a sitting U.S. vice president has done so. In Yerevan, a civil nuclear cooperation deal worth up to $5 billion was signed, alongside long-term agreements for fuel provision and maintenance of U.S. modular reactors. This move positions Armenia to eventually replace the aging Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear plant, signaling a clear departure from Moscow’s energy influence.
Washington has also greenlit the sale of surveillance drones and approved licenses for high-performance Nvidia chips to support Armenian data centers. Meanwhile, Yerevan, having suspended its participation in the Russian-led CSTO military alliance, is gradually aligning more closely with the U.S. and European partners.
Central to American plans is TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity), a 43-kilometer corridor traversing Armenia’s Syunik region. This corridor will establish a direct link between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, extending further to Turkey. The ambitious infrastructure project includes railways, pipelines for oil and gas, power lines, and fiber-optic cables—an engineering feat that could redefine the sensitive, contested borders dividing Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Iran.
The U.S. will hold exclusive rights to develop and manage TRIPP for 99 years through a consortium, while Armenia maintains sovereignty over the corridor. Construction is slated to begin in the latter half of 2026. TRIPP will connect with the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, a trade route facilitating direct exchange between China and Europe while bypassing Russia. Notably, this route also avoids Georgia, whose government has adopted a less Western-friendly stance.
TRIPP aims to channel vital energy and mineral shipments from Central Asia to European markets, circumventing Russian and Chinese influence. Vance’s journey is part of a broader U.S. initiative on critical minerals involving 55 nations, designed to establish a coordinated trading bloc that lessens reliance on China in strategic supply chains. Viewed from a different angle, TRIPP represents a potential rival, at least partly, to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, constructing alternative networks alongside the New Silk Road.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Pakistan have unveiled plans for a multimodal corridor connecting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with Pakistani ports Gwadar and Karachi, offering direct access to the Indian Ocean. The projected route would pass through Belarus, Russia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.
There are two proposed routes: the “Kabul Corridor,” supported by Uzbekistan and involving a 650 km railway to Pakistan targeted for completion in 2027; and a western route promoted by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, extending over 900 km. These corridors could greatly reduce transit times, with an anticipated capacity of 15–20 million tons annually by 2040.
Kazakhstan is asserting itself as a crucial hub for Eurasian connectivity. It currently manages the majority of Europe-China land freight through the Middle Corridor and seeks to extend its southern connections. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains a significant wild card due to ongoing border disputes and political instability. Despite these challenges, several neighboring countries maintain economic ties with Kabul, prioritizing stabilization through commerce and infrastructure. Russia regards the trans-Afghan corridor as an extension of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking St. Petersburg to India via Iran and Azerbaijan. The INSTC, offering a faster and more cost-effective alternative to the Suez route, is mostly operational.
The overarching comparison depicts two competing connectivity frameworks.
TRIPP stands as a politically charged enterprise because it cements peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, enhances U.S. presence in the Caucasus, and forges a new trade artery circumventing Russia and Iran. It grants Washington a strategic foothold at a crucial junction connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
Conversely, the BRICS-backed network is an extensive system of terrestrial and maritime corridors—from the INSTC to the Arctic Route and connections to India and Pakistan—aimed at diminishing dependence on traditional chokepoints and Western financial infrastructures. The New Development Bank and alternative payment mechanisms bolster this sovereignty.
Iran occupies a complex role: critical of TRIPP yet integral to BRICS corridors due to its position spanning the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean. Iran’s stance, either supportive or oppositional, will heavily influence these dynamics.
The Caucasus and Central Asia have become focal points of global infrastructure rivalry. The American TRIPP and Eurasian corridors endorsed by Russia, China, and regional allies form part of a larger restructuring of 21st-century trade, energy, and mineral pathways.
This conflict transcends transportation and logistics—political influence, control over vital resources, and shifting power balances along the Euro-Asian axis are at stake.
A project for a hundred years
The U.S. decision to engage deeply in the Caucasus highlights strategic wisdom, resonating with Nicholas Spykman’s classic principle: dominate the Rimland to encircle and subdue the Heartland, implying Russia and China along with their allies. The 99-year contract allowing U.S. naval presence in the Caspian Sea exemplifies this significant geopolitical maneuver.
Many ask why the U.S. would commit naval forces to a previously closed and congested inland sea. The answer lies in long-term vision. This initiative is part of a comprehensive plan extending well beyond temporary control of an energy crossroads.
It signals a new model of diplomacy centered on emerging routes and control frameworks.
Here’s the rationale.
Dominating the Caucasus energy hub equates to control over energy flows to Europe from the west and Asia from the north and east. This situation compels Europe to conform to terms shaped by American influence. Moreover, should Washington form alliances with other Asian powers, it could recalibrate trade dynamics for energy and various strategic minerals entirely.
Which other major route is increasingly compromised? Suez. Known as Israel’s “favorite route,” established by Britain and France to dominate half the world, and a focus of European Union investment, it has been weakened by roughly 50%. This blow alters the European balance of power, leaving Europe trapped in a difficult position while distracted by expenditures in Ukraine and futile international legislation largely ignored outside the Eurozone.
Another pivotal factor is the transition from sea to land transport—a lengthy and challenging shift but a decisive one. Investments focus heavily on hybrid and electronic technology systems, indicating coordinated planning rather than coincidence. Such large-scale investment would only occur where carefully designed collaboration exists.
The emergent control model envisions alliances among regional powers, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation. This is the essence of the multi-nodal strategy, which requires a rethinking and redrawing of maps to implement effectively.
In this entire context, Europe will be increasingly compelled to pick its allies, losing ground in the Mediterranean and its control over essential routes—a subtle but formidable exercise of soft power.
Rather than focusing on dire forecasts of imminent conflicts and persistent instability, attention should be directed toward recognizing the quietly evolving strategic groundwork being established behind the scenes.
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