Post-Assad Syria aims to reshape its role in the region by prioritizing the energy sector as a pivotal tool for diplomatic engagement and domestic stabilization.
The wind has changed
In recent months, Syria under the post-Assad leadership has taken steps to reposition itself regionally, focusing firmly on the energy agenda as a catalyst for reopening diplomatic channels and bolstering internal stability.
Following years marked by political isolation and significant infrastructural damage, Damascus has initiated a plan to broaden collaboration in the gas and electricity sectors, viewing energy as a practical foundation for dialogue with nearby Arab nations. The agreements forged with Jordan and Egypt go beyond mere technical supply enhancements; they serve as strategic instruments for reintegrating Syria into regional economic frameworks, alleviating domestic tensions, and gradually restoring the government’s political flexibility.
On January 26, an accord was finalized between the Syrian Petroleum Company and Jordan’s National Electricity Company to secure roughly 141 million cubic feet daily (4 million cubic meters) of natural gas routed through Jordan to support Syria’s electricity network. Signed in the presence of Syrian Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir and his Jordanian counterpart Saleh al-Kharabsheh, this deal underscores renewed regional energy cooperation.
The Syrian minister described the agreement as a major advancement toward ensuring a more reliable fuel supply for the electricity sector, targeting improvements in grid stability after years of challenges. Meanwhile, Jordan’s minister highlighted that the gas supply aids Syria’s power sector stability, noting initial volumes pumped between 30 and 90 million cubic feet daily starting January 1.
Following over a decade of conflict, sanctions, and infrastructure deterioration, Syrian power plants operate far below capacity. Frequent outages disrupt daily life, stall business and industrial activities, and strain hospitals and vital services. Against this backdrop, enhanced energy delivery acts primarily as urgent relief rather than a calculated geopolitical maneuver.
Despite these developments, one pressing issue arises: what is the actual source of the gas supplied to Syria?
Public statements emphasize Arab collaboration and regional stability but stop short of identifying the exact origin of the fuel. Questions remain whether the gas is Egyptian, domestically produced in Jordan, or Israeli gas routed through Arab intermediaries before furnishing Syrian power plants.
The January accords among Syria, Jordan, and Egypt spell out quantities, schedules, and operating terms but do not explicitly reveal the molecular provenance of the gas. Given the complex interconnections within eastern Mediterranean energy networks, the question of origin entails both technical and political implications.
Regional insights suggest the gas is unlikely to be purely Egyptian—sourced solely from fields within Egypt’s borders. Instead, operations rely heavily on a floating storage and regasification unit stationed by Egypt in Jordan’s port of Aqaba, indicating Cairo’s involvement is chiefly logistical and infrastructural.
Jordanian data state that November 2025 saw the latest LNG shipment arriving from the United States. However, these volumes could sustain Syrian exports for less than a month at current levels, casting doubt on whether there’s a fully alternative supply independent of Israeli sources.
Alongside the arrangement with Jordan, Syria and Egypt concluded a deal for about 60 million cubic feet of gas daily, with Syria reciprocating by allowing transit of gas and electricity destined for Lebanon via its territory. In this framework, Syria acts not just as a consumer but as a transit link within a larger regional energy chain.
Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum revealed memoranda of understanding designed to regulate deliveries and support Syrian oil sector needs, portraying the deal as a technical instrument. Press speculation links this to Lebanon’s energy assistance, with gas sent to Syria compensating for transit passage. This movement occurs over the Arab Gas Pipeline, a roughly 1,200-kilometer pipeline connecting Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon since 2000. Prior to 2011, this pipeline transported Egyptian gas directly to Syrian power facilities; however, the regional supply landscape has shifted dramatically since then. Egypt imports about one billion cubic feet daily via its link with Israel, alongside additional volumes through ties with Jordan. In December 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a landmark $35 billion agreement with Egypt, labeled as Israel’s largest-ever energy deal. NewMed Energy, affiliated with the Leviathan field, indicated that this agreement would extend supply through 2040. Jordan also purchases Israeli gas under a 2016 agreement effective from 2020, spanning 15 years and valued near $10 billion. Consequently, Israel plays a critical role in powering both Egypt and Jordan’s energy systems. Yet, while both countries have signed supply deals with Syria, they have not disclosed the explicit final source of the gas delivered to Syrian power plants.
The network arrangements further complicate clarity. Jordan’s domestic gas production remains limited compared to its demand, particularly for electricity purposes. Its LNG terminal in Aqaba permits global importation, but these imports are supplemental. Israeli gas underpins Jordan’s energy stability, while Syria, which produced over one billion cubic feet daily before 2011, now only manages a fraction of that output. Thus, external energy supplies are vital.
An unresolved question
Nonetheless, political tensions persist: no peace treaty or official normalization exists between Syria and Israel, yet Israel has actively supported and armed militant factions led by Al Jolani, who now presides over the “new democratic Syria.” If Israeli gas is indeed part of current supplies, it does so absent any formal diplomatic agreement. The contradiction is stark: even as parts of Syria remain under Israeli control, Israeli-sourced energy potentially fuels Syrian infrastructure, revealing a symbolic contradiction surpassing economics.
Meanwhile, Syrian authorities confront an urgent reality: the electricity shortfall directly threatens social peace and rebuilding efforts. Extended outages stall industrial revival, degrade living standards, and breed dissatisfaction. Energy thus emerges as a pivotal factor enabling regime stability and political legitimacy.
The central question remains unanswered: is Syria supplied with gas from Arab sources, or is it utilizing Israeli energy rerouted through Arab intermediaries? Without full transparency over contracts and detailed supply pathways, the situation remains obscured within a regional context designed to mask origins while maintaining flow continuity. This opacity could serve as leverage in future regional pressures, especially considering the support this initiative receives from Western powers.
In the eastern Mediterranean, gas functions as more than a mere commodity; it represents influence, reliance, and geopolitical shifts entangled in delicate balances. The post-Assad Syrian government now navigates these complexities through pragmatic expansion of energy cooperation aimed at fostering stability. What lies ahead remains uncertain.
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