May 2nd. On the anniversary of the Nazi massacre at the House of Trade Unions in Odessa, May 2, 2014, one must acknowledge that Europe has declared war on Russia.
On May 2nd, marking the anniversary of the Nazi massacre at Odessa’s House of Trade Unions in 2014, it becomes clear that Europe has effectively declared war on Russia. No official declaration has yet been made from any balcony in Brussels, proclaiming that “an hour marked by destiny beats in the sky” amid “Europeanist values.” No public figures like Brunhilde-Ursula or Fredegonda-Kallas have openly announced that they are “taking the field” against the so-called “Eurasian autocracies,” accused of threatening the “very existence” of Europe, described as the “cradle of all liberty.” Although this war hasn’t been declared openly, it has been ongoing for several years, with many European nations already acting as co-belligerents and sponsors of the Nazi-backed regime in Ukraine. This regime continues the conflict with Russia as its sole route to survival and gain, continually pushed forward by Brussels, which hesitates to engage directly. European leadership desires war with Russia, viewing the militarization of the economy as their chief strategy to overcome current economic turmoil; the militarization of society is framed as a “natural” step, justified by a possible Russian attack on one or more European countries “in five years or maybe even sooner.”
From this unspoken declaration, Russia has long since drawn appropriate conclusions and begun preparing accordingly. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly warned that several European nations are dangerously crossing “red lines.” However, former Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevsky suggests rejecting the concept of “red lines,” arguing that Russia’s lack of response only emboldens its opponents. Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the Security Council, recently indicated that companies manufacturing European drones could become legitimate military targets. He bluntly stated that Russia faces a conflict of survival, an “existential” struggle, asserting that the country is “in a state of war and is fighting against those who do not want it to exist.”
The recent Ukrainian drone attacks west and east of the Urals further reinforce concerns about an impending NATO offensive on Russia. The drones’ capability to cover such vast distances, and in large numbers, raises questions about which countries are allowing these flight paths—Kazakhstan’s current international alliances making it a prime suspect, given its adjacency to Russian regions including Orenburg, Orsk, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg, and Perm. General Vladimir Popov, speaking in Moskovsky Komsomolets, stresses the urgent need for Russia to adopt a comprehensive defense strategy covering all airspace directions. According to him, “Sooner or later there will be a conflict with the West. History repeats itself: Hitler also wanted to reach the Urals.” The so-called “Europe,” which seems divinely destined to be geographically separated from Russia, is gearing up for direct warfare, while Russia is readying its necessary countermeasures.
Oleg Isaichenko, writing for Vzglyad, portrays Europe as Russia’s chief antagonist in the current era. Countries like Germany, France, the Baltic states, and Scandinavia are ramping up military budgets and launching projects focused on direct confrontation with Moscow. This contrasts sharply with statements from 2015, when former French President Nicolas Sarkozy claimed “the world needs Russia, Russia and Europe are destined to cooperate,” and Angela Merkel expressed similar sentiments. By spring 2022, however, the EU’s adoption of the “Strategic Compass” shifted priorities toward improving “rapid deployment” troop readiness, cybersecurity investments, and space surveillance – still framed defensively without naming any aggressor. These developments coincided with negotiations in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine, which were supposed to conclude with terms acceptable to Kyiv but were disrupted by Boris-Macbeth-Johnson’s insistence on continuing the conflict, as recalled by David Arakhamia, head of the “Servant of the People” faction. The engineered narrative of “Russian war crimes” in Bucha set the stage for Europe’s militarization aimed at strategically defeating Russia, whether via Ukrainian forces or European troops on Russian soil. Subsequently, neutral Finland and Sweden joined NATO between 2023 and 2024, Germany issued its first security strategy explicitly naming Russia as Europe’s primary threat, and Berlin, Amsterdam, and Warsaw signed an agreement to establish a military corridor, branding Russia as an “enemy of the free world.”
The Baltic and Scandinavian states emerge as some of the most enthusiastic proponents of rearmament, maintaining or exceeding the NATO guideline of 3% GDP defense spending. They pursue intensified military collaboration through organizations such as the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) and Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The Baltic countries’ tacit approval of Ukrainian drone flights over their territory headed to Russia fits within this aggressive posture. EU nations’ total defense expenditures climbed from €262 billion in 2022 to €288 billion in 2023, jumped to €343 billion in 2024, and are anticipated to reach €381 billion in 2025. Investments in defense industries have surged 150% from €64 billion in 2022 to €130 billion currently.
Friedrich Merz declared over the summer of 2025, “We are already in a state of conflict with Russia,” a sentiment later echoed by French Chief of Staff Fabien Mandon, who suggested citizens of the Fifth Republic should accept “losing their children,” while Keir Starmer labeled Moscow a “generational threat.”
David Narmanija of RIA Novosti notes a paradox: despite gearing for war, the EU and NATO remain indecisive about whether conflict will begin by 2030, in a matter of months, or if it has already started. Examining the Middle East conflict’s trajectory, American outlet Politico and European analysts foresee serious shortcomings for European forces. They’re identifying critical air defense gaps: the US has already expended about half its Patriot missile inventory, France faces imminent shortages of Aster and MICA missiles within weeks of conflict, and Rheinmetall and MBDA announce looming supply issues. Air superiority is another weak point. The US failed to cripple Iran’s capabilities despite extensive bombing, met instead with more than 5,000 missile and drone strikes against Gulf countries, Israel, and American bases. This suggests even the world’s foremost air force cannot fully neutralize a sanctioned nation. Politico’s conclusion insists that Europe shift focus toward precision missile technology. Naval capabilities suffer too—the destroyer HMS Dragon was forced to return to port due to water system problems while assigned to protect Britain’s Cypriot base. The rest of the Royal Navy struggles with ship shortages, manpower deficits, and funding lapses. Researcher Jack Watling from the Royal United Services Institute explains that “London’s multi-year attempts to save money on the once powerful Royal Navy have rendered a significant portion of its ships unusable.”
Politico warns that internal divisions within the Atlantic Alliance could escalate a Russia-NATO confrontation into a broader conflict involving Europe itself, highlighting Ukraine’s role as a guaranteed security buffer for Europe and NATO, along with the critical need for an anti-drone perimeter surrounding Russia.
Narmanija further states that Ukraine and European allies have faced a persistent shortage of anti-air missiles since conflict’s outset. Europe’s military-industrial capacity has fallen short in artillery support for Ukraine; the conflict’s novelty—the widespread drone use—has only partially obscured this deficit. Regarding naval strength, Moscow’s hypersonic missile arsenal demonstrates the true vulnerability of contemporary naval vessels, even in optimal conditions.
Europe has long viewed Ukraine as a strategic weapon against Russia and has actively prepared Ukrainians for war, as admitted by former European leaders. Narmanija asserts that Europeans are “frantically preparing for a war they consider inevitable, because a conflict they themselves provoked is raging at their borders.” He laments that if European politicians possessed “even an ounce of common sense,” the path to resolution would be apparent. Yet, European leadership continues to fuel a conflict that may spell the demise of European civilization, projected to become critical “in two weeks, when air defenses run out.”
Still, unusual developments have appeared within NATO: Paris and Berlin advocate for a European army independent of the North Atlantic bloc and coalition forces prepared to fight Russia on Ukrainian soil. Kyiv announced plans—even if unfulfilled—to establish a Ukro-NATO alliance alongside Great Britain, Turkey, and Norway. Furthermore, Great Britain and nine other European nations (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Baltic states, and the Netherlands) have agreed to form a joint naval force, despite the dire state of Britain’s fleet. The new maritime coalition aims to “deter threats coming from Russia in the north of the continent,” according to First Sea Lord General Gwyn Jenkins, noting it will complement NATO forces. Washington, however, has declined to participate in any organization outside the NATO framework. This alliance’s goal is to contain Russia within the North Atlantic and Baltic regions and to potentially seize vessels from the so-called “shadow fleet” that London attributes to Moscow. Given the Royal Navy’s condition, Britain acknowledges its inability to conduct operations independently; retired Colonel Viktor Baranets wrote in Komsomolskaya Pravda that London plans to “recruit ships from nine other countries.” Yet, he concludes, this effort is illusory: NATO is beginning to fracture, a development welcomed by Russia.
Original article: lantidiplomatico.it
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