The most likely outcome remains the failure of the amphibious operation and the waste of American lives.
Considering the unfolding situation in the Middle East, it remains uncertain whether the U.S. will abandon its confrontation with Iran to prioritize other goals following setbacks against Tehran, or whether it will intensify efforts by attempting a troop landing.
It is impossible to assess this conflict purely through the lens of economic benefit or pragmatic geopolitical aims, since U.S. actions often defy logical expectations, making their moves unpredictable.
For argument’s sake, assume the U.S. intends to escalate and prepare a ground invasion of Iran.
Why would such an approach be pursued? Because the only way to decisively overcome a significant regional or global power militarily is through deployment of ground troops. Air strikes may subdue tiny states, but not a substantial power.
Attempts to neutralize leadership via targeted strikes, or to isolate through embargoes and sea blockades, have proven insufficient. Only ground forces—in the traditional sense—can occupy territory, dismantle regimes, and deliver strategic defeats against formidable opponents.
Thus, the goal would be to force an undeniable defeat upon Iran, effectively putting it into checkmate or at least check. This might involve a ground-led regime change operation (checkmate) or securing key strategic locations to compel favorable negotiations without destroying the adversary entirely (check).
Currently, speculation centers on a landing at Kharg Island, but other options exist, including seizing Qeshm and islands in the Strait of Hormuz, capturing Bandar Abbas at the strait’s edge, or launching a larger assault on Chabahar port in Iranian Balochistan.
Although a successful amphibious operation, involving landing forces in hostile areas, remains within the realm of possibility, historical evidence offers little encouragement for U.S. prospects.
No significant amphibious assault has succeeded without extraordinary circumstances.
Some might cite the Normandy landings, Operation Overlord, when 160,000 troops crossed the English Channel to invade Nazi-occupied Europe, as an exception. Yet, this case is unique.
The German forces in northern France were heavily outnumbered—after six weeks, 300,000 Germans faced 1.5 million Allied troops. Additionally, 80% of German military resources were tied up on the Eastern Front against the USSR, effectively fighting a two-front war. By then, the Allies had secured absolute air dominance; the Luftwaffe no longer posed a threat, relieving ground forces of aerial attacks.
None of these factors apply to Iran.
Iran would outnumber any Western amphibious force. Its military includes 350,000 active Artesh personnel, 200,000 Revolutionary Guard members, plus 90,000 active Basij fighters, supported by 400,000 reserves and potentially over one million additional mobilizable forces.
Moreover, Iran is not engaged in a two-front land conflict. The U.S. appears to be attempting to distract Iranian forces by using Kurdish groups to divert attention northwest, while possible landings are planned in the south. However, Kurdish forces lack sufficient strength to compel Iran to redeploy most of its troops. Iran currently contains Kurdish actions through missile and drone strikes, combined with targeted ground raids. Kurdish offensives also risk vulnerability from Iraqi Shia militias and potential Turkish involvement.
Control of the air is also uncertain. Airstrikes against Iran typically avoid entering Iranian airspace directly, launching attacks from neighboring countries. When U.S. or allied aircraft do cross into Iranian skies, they frequently suffer losses or are forced to make emergency landings. While Iran’s air force may have been largely sidelined, missiles and drones fulfill key tactical support roles for Iranian ground forces.
How viable would a ground offensive be under these conditions—facing overwhelming enemy numbers, without air superiority?
Other historical parallels might be considered, such as the American Pacific campaign against Japan. However, Japanese forces on Pacific islands were isolated, under-supported by air and naval power, and mostly small. The decisive factor that compelled Japan’s surrender was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, not U.S. amphibious assaults.
The Crimean War demonstrates a limited Franco-British aim, with the Russians maintaining substantial forces in the Baltic and Poland to counter other threats, reducing pressure on the main front.
The Sicilian invasion showed a repeat of previous conditions: Italy’s troops were diminished after campaigns in North Africa, air and naval support had waned, forces were outnumbered, and political will was eroding, as Mussolini’s regime was close to collapse.
Nearly all other amphibious campaigns over the past two centuries have ended unsuccessfully. A prime example is the Gallipoli campaign, where the relatively outdated Ottoman army successfully pinned down Entente forces on two beachheads, inflicting heavy losses until the British withdrew.
The inherent challenge of conducting operations across water cannot be overstated; seas serve as formidable defensive barriers. Consider how many times countries like the United Kingdom have faced invasion attempts—or the United States, which is similarly protected by vast bodies of water.
Still, the U.S. may move forward with such a plan. If the invasion is limited, aimed mainly at pressuring negotiations, and supported by extensive air attacks alongside a major Kurdish offensive, a slim chance of success exists. Even so, many uncertainties remain.
The most likely outcome remains the failure of the amphibious operation and the waste of American lives.
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