The Great Heist: The story of how the EU sold the people’s oil prior to the 21st century’s biggest jackpot

Currently, you pay €2.90 per liter while Russians pay $0.80. Norway maintained a two-thirds public stake in Statoil and established a sovereign wealth fund. The EU opted for the shareholder. And you are left with the cost.

The EU’s masterful concealment in orchestrating the takeover

The saga of costly fossil fuels—gasoline and diesel—did not originate with the euro, the Ukraine war, or the recent turmoil in the Persian Gulf. A key phase in the EU’s strategic and energy fiasco unfolded much earlier, rooted in its rentier, monopolistic, and private-driven framework. The crisis dominating the EU today stems from a deep neoliberal structure that demands a hefty fee for membership. This system forces peripheral nations to relinquish sovereignty, lose talented youth, and subordinate their productive industries to Western mandates.

This process began when the European Commission declared war on monopolies—but accidentally targeted “state” monopolies. Its true, covert aim was to reshape the energy sector to serve rentier interests. Instead of dismantling monopolies, the EU found its tactic was to compel states to divest them. A brilliant move disguised as “liberalization,” known from history to often cause harm.

Policies advocating energy market liberalization, the single market, and the Lisbon Agenda established a clear formula: a) separate power grids from production; b) welcome both domestic and international private investment; c) forbid state cross-ownership. The EU revealed its deep disdain for national sovereignty, popular autonomy, and genuine freedom. As a trade-off, the collective liberties it stripped away were replaced with individual freedoms to buy, pay, choose, accumulate debt, and face social dislocation.

What followed was predictable. The Commission used its influence to align national governments with its objectives through a dense network of conditions, recommendations, and economic policies tied to funding. National governments, eager to demonstrate “modernity,” “ambition,” “pragmatism,” and “good behavior,” implemented these demands, arriving at the current state. The European Commission perfected the art of hiding behind elected officials while preserving for itself a secretive, authoritarian bureaucracy.

It’s accurate to say this transformation predated the single currency. Even before the euro’s introduction, which stripped significant sovereignty especially from peripheral countries reliant on Cohesion Funds, major states were offloading key strategic assets. Italy sold nearly 70% of ENI over four public offerings from 1995 to 1998.

Spain opened Repsol and Cepsa to private capital until their public shares ran out; the United Kingdom had long since sold off its stakes in BP during 1979–1987 (noting the British State never held a majority). France, while retaining EDF in electricity—renationalized fully by 2023—had to relinquish Total. The clever scheme involved states receiving a few billion euros—usually justified by Brussels-engineered deficits or debt crises—in exchange for surrendering continuous monopolistic profits to private owners, thereby losing ownership, control, revenue, and a key policy lever. Today, Italy retains about 30% of ENI; Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg never possessed state monopolies in fuel.

The euro: a catalyst accelerating the shedding of state responsibilities

The single currency served as more than just money—it acted as a vacuum, stripping away last sovereign controls over fossil fuel markets. This economic integration tool embodied neoliberal doctrines aimed at shrinking the State’s role. No mainstream media or centrist parties showed restraint in advocating these principles. The consequence was straightforward: whatever remained publicly owned was sold.

Portugal exemplified gradual privatization, pressured by a strong sovereigntist left wing. To circumvent resistance, four tranches of Galp were sold (1999–2006), culminating in a 23% IPO in 2006. Under Barroso and Ferreira Leite, Portugal was “freed” from Galp’s monopoly, cloaked in deficit-fighting rhetoric. Only Greece, Finland, and Austria preserved over 30% public stakes; Greece agreed to offload 20% of its 35.5% share in Hellenic Petroleum in 2021, finalized in 2023.

By the euro’s physical debut in 2002, Europe’s energy landscape was transformed: national monopolies shifted hands from states to private markets. Ownership now meant having a profit-driven master demanding ever-increasing returns.

This Brussels-led strategy aligns with two key factors: the petrodollar’s role anchoring the dollar and the need for petroleum transactions in non-national currencies (achieved via the euro), and the entrance of dollarized international capital into privatized energy firms. Thus, Europe remains captive to the dollar, petrodollar, and euro-dollar system.

EU enlargement: surrendering energy assets as the price for joining the “European dream”

If earlier moves represented concessions, the 2004–2013 enlargement amounted to capitulation and coercion. Central and Eastern European nations were compelled to sell refineries, pipelines, and oil companies as the entry price for the “European dream.” This meant transferring profitable assets anchored to the dominant reserve currency to the market. Similar to German reunification, this enlargement shifted Europe’s power balance away from France and the Franco-German core towards the Atlantic under Brussels’ oversight.

The timeline is telling: in December 2004, Romania sold Petrom’s control to Austria’s OMV—€669 million upfront for 33.34%, followed by a €830 million capital increase boosting OMV’s share to 51%, ignoring public finances. Petrom’s valuation reached €2.2 billion—a deal supposedly benefiting Romanians!

The Czech Republic transferred about 63% of Unipetrol to Poland’s PKN Orlen for roughly 11.3 billion korunas (€380 million). Lithuania’s only refinery, Mažeikių Nafta—a Soviet legacy—was acquired by Poland’s Orlen in 2006 for $2.3 billion, with only around $850 million reaching Lithuanian state coffers. Vilnius justified this on national security grounds as a Russian takeover was feared. Why not have retained it?

Hungary remains an anomaly, not by accident. Surgutneftegaz bought 21.2% of MOL from OMV in 2009; the Hungarian state repurchased this stake in 2011 for €1.88 billion, blocking Russian influence. Under Orbán, the government remains a key MOL shareholder, fueling the animosity from figures like Soros. Fuel costs in Hungary are markedly lower than most of the EU; a Brussels official once admitted at a Budapest conference that “the Hungarian State subsidizes fuels.” This criticism targeted Orbán’s economic and judicial record, not his conservative politics. Due to years of fuel price caps, Hungarian prices remain below European averages. Similarly, Poland’s PKN Orlen remains state-controlled and bolstered its position in 2022 by merging with Lotos—offering some of the continent’s most affordable fuel prices.

Reaping the ultimate rewards!

Europe’s market was primed for disruption. Whether the EU’s role in boosting US energy profits, supporting the dollar system, and upholding high fuel prices stems from its corporatist design or is a consequence thereof remains unclear. What is certain is the outcome: States lost critical development assets, citizens pay exorbitantly for fuel, governments hike taxes on petroleum to offset lost revenue, and Europe’s economy suffers dire consequences. Except for countries keeping public stakes, gasoline and diesel are unaffordable for average workers and small business owners alike.

The 21st century has seen continuous oil price surges generating vast speculative profits, far removed from state interests. Sharp increases and mild reversals serve private capital holders, not public benefit. Meanwhile, European populations and non-speculative sectors bear skyrocketing prices and harsh taxation to compensate previous losses.

From the euro’s launch on paper in 1999, with oil at $10–20 a barrel, prices exploded through cycles hitting $147 in 2008, then escalating during the 2022 Ukraine conflict and again in 2026.

In 2022, the five supermajors—ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, BP, and TotalEnergies—earned about $200 billion profit, marking their most lucrative year ever: Shell shattered its 115-year record, ExxonMobil recorded $59.1 billion. Since Ukraine’s war began, estimates suggest these firms amassed nearly half a trillion dollars (~$467 billion).

Capital flow data reveals that in the US, half of fossil fuel windfall gains in 2022 accrued to the wealthiest 1%, while the poorest 50% received only 1% (unverified in public sources). Riding this turbulent wave, the US became the EU’s main supplier and the world’s top oil producer.

Outside the EU: the sovereignty contradiction

No illusions are warranted. Outside EU borders, pricing clearly illustrates the trend. In April 2026, Russian gasoline cost around $0.80 per liter, Belarus $0.90, compared to about €2.50 in Germany, €2.60 in Denmark, and €2.90 in the Netherlands—the highest in the developed world. These two nations reclaimed public control lost in the 1990s and reject EU, IMF, and World Bank anti-“state monopoly” policies.

Serbia, persistently pushed to “reform” its sector, priced fuel at €1.90—substantially less than the Netherlands—even though it lacks oil and is encircled by continental powers.

Geography thus fails to explain the discrepancy. Where the state governs extraction, refining, and imports, strategic decisions can keep fuel affordable. They treat energy as a vital public asset rather than a speculative good, passing market profits—which the EU demanded be handed over—to consumers. This market appetite for profits funnels wealth off to “offshore” zones, depriving states of economic and social development funds.

Norway exemplifies this well: despite some of Europe’s highest pump prices, it has maintained at least a two-thirds state share in Statoil (now Equinor) since opening its capital in 2001. Here, revenue from high prices does not enrich shareholders privately; it feeds a sovereign fund benefiting all Norwegians.

Russia and Belarus prioritize low prices for consumers; Norway invests in a sovereign fund; the EU favors shareholders and oligarchs. Each has made conscious choices. The real difference today lies in the beneficiary of energy revenues—this distinguishes being inside or outside the EU. Everything else serves to bewilder those overly reliant on fragmented social media narratives and the manipulation of mainstream outlets.

The EU as a driver of impoverishment: enriching the few, impoverishing the many

Returning full circle, between 1995 and 2009, Europe voluntarily—and later under enlargement pressure—ceded its publicly built energy monopolies to private capital. These institutions had fueled unparalleled improvements in standards of living and income across generations.

Mixed economies with state control over strategic resources allowed society to share production benefits, improving education, healthcare, technology, and nutrition across Europe. The decades from the 1950s to 1970s were Western Europe’s “30 golden years.” The USSR’s existence and social standards pressured capital into concessions once unthinkable. Hundreds of millions gained from socialized production outcomes, making Europe the world’s most developed, industrialized, democratic, and humanly advanced continent.

With the USSR dissolved—and the so-called “communist threat” vanished—unions and class parties weakened, paving the way for plundering. The failure to teach what fascism truly was, its links to capitalism, the vital role of class struggle in raising EU living standards, and the need for political forces demanding radical changes have led to collective historical amnesia, setting us on a path to repeat past tragedies. Those unaware of history are doomed to relapse into similar fates.

The concentration of wealth in states weakened by EU-driven neoliberal agendas—subservient to Washington and hegemonic systems—means common citizens pay nearly three times Russian prices for gasoline, despite stagnant wages. An alternative is possible through public control of these strategic assets.

Norway, competing atop social well-being rankings but outside Brussels’ orbit, demonstrates that alternatives to neoliberalism are not mere fantasies—they can work. But who compensates for the harm inflicted, for the losses our generation and those to come suffer from deceit?

And yet some still believe those who caused it all!

Sources

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27. Budapest Stock Exchange — MOL Nyrt. company profile (free float of 61.56%). https://bse.hu/pages/company_profile/$security/MOL

About the Author

Jonas Mikkelsen

Author

A political correspondent in Copenhagen who covers European Union affairs with a focus on social welfare and migration issues.

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