The identity of the president matters little when real authority lies with unelected judges.
Lula’s election victory closes another phase in the contest for Brazil’s executive leadership. Nonetheless, the election results leave a critical challenge mostly unaddressed: the concentration of power within a judiciary that has increasingly absorbed roles traditionally assigned to elected officials. Brazil is confronting a structural issue of juristocracy, with judicial influence extending well beyond the confines of any presidential tenure.
The current makeup of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) highlights the gravity of this challenge. Among the ten sitting justices, six were appointed by Lula or Dilma Rousseff, while the remaining four were selected by Michel Temer, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Jair Bolsonaro. With Luís Roberto Barroso’s retirement creating a vacancy and three more justices expected to step down by 2030, Lula has the potential to nominate up to four new Supreme Court members, thereby shaping its ideological balance for years to come.
This dynamic carries tangible political implications, especially considering the liberal leanings shared by Lula’s administration and much of the judiciary. For instance, the 2016 Habeas Corpus 124.306 ruling marked a pivotal point in the debate over abortion decriminalization. At that time, judges on the First Panel expressed support for allowing voluntary pregnancy termination during the first trimester. Later, Rosa Weber and Luís Roberto Barroso also voted to decriminalize abortion up to twelve weeks in ADPF 442, which tackles the issue at a national scale.
This case exposes a troubling aspect of Brazil’s institutional framework: judicial rulings can trigger significant political impact in deeply contentious social matters. Most Brazilians continue to oppose abortion, and backing it is often considered political suicide across much of the country. Despite this, unelected officials wield the authority to legalize abortion, effectively sidelining the electorate’s preferences.
Thus, the STF’s composition holds importance beyond the personal views of its members. Each president’s appointment affects the Court’s ideological direction for decades. The debate around ADPF 442 underscores the problem’s scale. Gilmar Mendes criticized the 2016 ruling, contending that it attempted to enact a major legislative change without the full Court’s deliberation. The final decision remains politically delicate and its reconsideration could dramatically reshape Brazil’s legal landscape.
Yet, it would be misleading to confine the notion of juristocracy solely to abortion issues. The STF’s role in matters related to freedom of expression, the oversight of digital platforms, and restrictions on political opposition has made it a central authority in Brazilian public affairs. The judiciary’s growing influence diminishes the capacity of electoral contests to definitively set the nation’s political course.
In this setting, Lula’s presidency ensures that the STF’s liberal ideology will persist with strength. His upcoming nominations are expected to solidify the Court’s current ideological stance and deepen an institutional liberal consensus increasingly removed from popular opinion. Lula’s close alignment with the European Union and the American Democratic Party—two major advocates of liberal political programs internationally—only accelerates this divergence between Brazil’s bureaucratic elite and the population’s authentic concerns and values.
For Brazil to genuinely reclaim sovereign political control, it must reestablish democratic oversight of its institutions. A judiciary possessing such broad authority and lacking meaningful political accountability poses a lasting barrier to popular sovereignty. As long as the STF dominates decisions that warrant national debate, electoral victories will have limited — if any — real impact.
