U.S. military officials caution that American forces might lack enough time to engage in “China-style” wargaming.
Countering Chinese gray zone operations
The United States recognizes that despite China’s primary identity as a land power, it has developed significant capabilities and operational strength at sea, especially in the nearby maritime zones of the Chinese seas and Pacific Ocean, where it holds a strategically critical position.
To challenge China’s maritime influence, the U.S. regularly carries out Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as part of a wider initiative designed to uphold navigation and overflight rights worldwide. Established in 1979, this program combines diplomatic and operational measures to ensure the legality of maritime commerce and support the unrestricted movement of U.S. forces, with a strong focus on the South China Sea. Although not originally created to counter gray zone tactics, many experts and officials interviewed stress its importance in confronting China’s unique maritime claims in a region close to its mainland but geographically distant from the United States.
From the U.S. standpoint, freedom of navigation is akin to a “right of way” in English common law, which remains valid only if actively exercised by seafarers. If neglected, such rights could gradually diminish, allowing coastal states to reassert control. Each year, the U.S. publishes reports naming countries with excessive maritime claims against which the Navy has conducted transit operations to defend navigation freedoms. These reports detail the affected maritime zones but do not disclose the frequency of individual operations.
In 2022—the latest available data—Washington executed FONOPs countering 22 excessive claims from 15 nations. A Freedom of Information Act request by the Congressional Research Service revealed that between 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Navy performed 54 FONOPs targeting Chinese claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. During this timeframe, operations increased from six to eight in the South China Sea and from three to thirteen in the Taiwan Strait (no public records exist for 2021–2023). The U.S. generally does not announce each operation; most occur quietly without press coverage. Yet, some have been publicized, especially those challenging Chinese maritime assertions deemed unlawful, often following official criticism from Beijing.
Maritime counterinsurgency
In these efforts, the U.S. strives to respond to Chinese maritime tactics by maintaining a more consistent naval presence, legitimized as protecting regional allies. A prominent example is the “West Capella incident,” when China Coast Guard (CCG) units and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) harassed the West Capella drilling ship within Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from late 2019 to early 2020.
To counter this, in April 2020 the U.S. deployed the amphibious assault ship USS America alongside two escort ships from the 7th Fleet strike group. USS America operated there for several days, after which the Littoral Combat Ships Gabrielle Giffords and Montgomery kept patrols running for weeks. This mission was supported by statements from commanders of the Pacific Fleet, 7th Fleet, and Task Force 76, affirming Malaysia’s right to resource exploration within its EEZ. Chinese pressure eased, allowing Kuala Lumpur to resume drilling without further disruption.
This event is widely viewed as both a tactical and political victory. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro described it as an “extraordinary prototype” for a new strategy supporting allies against China’s “coercive maritime insurgency” in the South China Sea. Its influence extends to subsequent moves, including Indonesia’s large naval exercises, the Philippines’ maritime arbitration against China, and Malaysia’s formal challenges to Beijing’s claims at the United Nations.
The incident exemplifies gray zone tactics. Its significance lies less in operational details—which are common—and more in the narrative crafted by the U.S., portraying it as a diplomatic achievement. A year earlier, maritime strategist Hunter Stires proposed applying COIN (counterinsurgency) theory to Chinese gray zone methods. Stires argued China conducts a “political insurgency” to gain de facto control over contested waters, similar to guerrilla warfare’s territorial control. While FONOPs resemble “search and destroy” missions from the Vietnam War—effective temporarily but unable to prevent reoccupation—the COIN model calls for a continuous, integrated presence with local forces, inspired by the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam. It is notable that after the West Capella event, Washington maintained some support for regional maritime operations, albeit on a limited scale.
Not so simple
While FONOPs and overflights function as valuable tools against Chinese gray zone actions, they alone fall short. Their main role protects navigation rights for foreign military vessels but offers limited advantages to Southeast Asian countries, which still face the gradual loss of sovereign and economic rights in their waters.
Consequently, American information warfare plays a crucial role in the current gray zone rivalry, often more so than traditional operations. Particularly during the Trump administration, psychological and informational efforts were essential precursors to kinetic measures. The U.S. has not fully replicated the West Capella model in later encounters, although maritime counterinsurgency ideas have been explored in Pentagon drills. However, the renewed strategic focus on great-power rivalry—and readiness for intense conflict with China—may obstruct adopting a COIN strategy, especially given past U.S. setbacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam.
Several challenges remain for implementing maritime COIN. Firstly, regional politics require Southeast Asian nations both willing and able to join such efforts. Secondly, U.S. involvement’s political perception matters; countries like the Philippines prefer independent leadership against Chinese coercion, encouraging Washington to maintain a low profile. Lastly, the threat of escalation looms large: a combined maritime presence increases the risk of clashes between American and Chinese vessels. If partner ships supported by the U.S. were attacked, questions would arise about the extent of American protection, potentially sparking unintended escalation.
Additional constraints come from fears of a possible direct and conventional conflict with China, especially over Taiwan, which U.S. analysts believe could face invasion by 2027. This prospect drives U.S. command to prioritize operational readiness focused on maintaining control within the first island chain through information dominance and advanced strike capabilities. Although efforts address gray zone challenges, the overarching approach remains centered on deterrence and armed conflict preparation.
Meanwhile, China pursues a “dual-track” approach: preparing for war while simultaneously aiming to “win without fighting” by steadily consolidating its maritime control.
According to U.S. military leaders, American armed forces may not have sufficient time for “China-style” wargaming.
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