Britain’s incoming prime minister will take charge of a nation that has, to the greatest extent possible without deploying its own forces or incurring casualties, effectively lost a war.
The next British prime minister will lead a country that, without directly committing troops or suffering losses, has essentially lost a conflict. Facing Russian superiority in equipment, struggling to staff extended frontline positions, and resorting to forcibly recruiting from the streets, Ukraine’s prospects for reversing the situation appear bleak.
Although Putin has yet to secure the rapid operational breakthrough that has eluded him since the war erupted, the increasing pace of territorial gains by Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine foreshadows a grim future. According to reports, US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll advised Ukrainian officials last week that Kyiv’s military stance is likely to deteriorate as Moscow’s improves. The United States’ doubts on Ukraine’s prospects risk becoming self-fulfilling, making Driscoll’s alleged caution to Kyiv—that “you are losing… and you need to accept the deal”—hard to contest.
The conclusion of this war will be shaped primarily by Russia and the United States, sidelining both Ukraine and Europe. This represents a setback for European Atlanticists who have pushed for a hardline approach toward Moscow, yet it also exemplifies the worldview they espouse. Europe’s deep integration into US defense frameworks leaves it unable to maintain a large-scale conflict without American backing—support no longer assured. The war offered Europe’s leaders a chance to fundamentally reshape the continent’s security structure towards strategic independence, asserting their interests and future. As Ukraine analyst Jade McGlynn, a strong supporter of Ukraine’s defense, notes, Europe “has chosen paralysis while others determine the fate of our continent” — a fate stemming from “decisions not taken, responsibilities avoided, and illusions clung to for too long,” including the “bizarre teleological liberalism that sees liberal democracy as somehow feted to win out according to the laws of history.”
Putin is no strategic mastermind, as early war days revealed. But he does not need to be with Europe’s current leadership. If Emmanuel Macron’s predicament is to be a historic figure trapped in his European leader role, it is a far greater misfortune that his peers govern Europe. The continent has failed the historic challenge before it, retreating to seeking a manageable war outcome it cannot impose. Europe oscillates between unsustainable hawkish demands—such as Kaja Kallas’s recent call for Russia’s demilitarization—and degrading acts of subservience to Washington, exposing their true position. As a result, Europe’s bellicose rhetoric about the Ukraine war increasingly diverges from reality.
The straightforward fact remains that the United States, Europe’s security guarantor, desires an end to the conflict more urgently than Russia, which still aims for total military victory. Ukraine’s core goal of preserving the Kyiv government’s independence conflicts more with Europe’s, which sees the Ukrainian military’s role as distracting and weakening Russian forces long enough for Europe to rearm or for some unforeseen solution to emerge. From earlier unrealistic hopes of total victory and overreach, Kyiv must now seek the least painful defeat available, a reality Europe’s political debate has yet to acknowledge.
Nevertheless, for Britain, losing a proxy conflict remains preferable to losing a war that involves the country directly. Due to years of poor management, the British Army lacks significant artillery and air defense capabilities, cannot assemble its NATO-mandated armored brigade, and is incapable of sustaining munitions expended in high-intensity warfare beyond a few days. The incoming prime minister will head a nation heavily entwined in a losing war while simultaneously eroding its own military capacity through incompetence. Having neglected to rebuild deterrent capabilities since the largest European land war began in 2014, expecting improvements if Britain were drawn into combat would be overly optimistic. This precarious situation means that accepting a Washington-enforced peace agreement that removes Britain from such a predicament, even if unsatisfactory, may be necessary.
Yet bringing Britain’s political elite to terms with this harsh reality remains challenging. Though motivated by good intentions, prior hawkish commentators who sabotaged peace talks ultimately harmed Ukraine’s position. Ukraine and Europe would have benefited from negotiating peace while possessing relative advantage in 2022 or 2023. However, such opportunities were lost, and advocates for negotiation were dismissed as Putin sympathizers by commentators convinced Ukraine would liberate Crimea, depose Putin, and fragment Russia. Ignoring any fanciful hopes that Zach Polanski could mesmerize Putin into disarming, the likely next prime minister could be Nigel Farage leading Reform with sweeping reform aims or a Labour reformer. Shabana Mahmood has already positioned herself as a bearer of tough realities, while another Labour figure, Defence Secretary John Healey, has the credibility to adjust Britain’s rhetoric to match its diminished capabilities.
Britain’s new leader will be compelled to craft a cautious and pragmatic security strategy balancing four key powers: the United States, whose willingness and capacity to defend Europe is clearly declining; a fragmented Europe unable to mount sustained collective action; Russia, whose forceful foreign policy will be vindicated by the war’s outcome; and China, history’s most powerful industrial nation.
Given current military and economic weaknesses and intense domestic political unrest, maintaining Britain’s hawkish global posture is no longer feasible. Even if an interventionist foreign policy were sound or popular—which it is not—it is beyond Britain’s present capacity. Regrettably, Farage’s appointment of neoconservative Alan Mendoza from the Henry Jackson Society as foreign policy adviser signals an embrace of full-scale ideological conflict, a stance even Washington hesitates to take. It is plausible that Farage’s need to dispel unfounded accusations of being a Russian asset—a Brexit-era myth stemming from the Clinton-backed Russiagate conspiracy—will push him toward reckless hawkishness seeking approval from a skeptical commentariat that is unlikely to relent.
“Even if an interventionist foreign policy were wise — which it is not — or electorally popular — which it is not — it is simply now beyond our ability”
If Ukraine manages to maintain its effective independence from Russia, secure credible guarantees from the US, and join the EU, then conceding territory it currently lacks and likely won’t reclaim might be an acceptable outcome. Such a trade-off is preferable to losing the land it presently holds or agreeing to an even harsher settlement later. The Trump administration favored lucrative economic collaboration with Moscow and openly sought a stable diplomatic relationship. Whether this is attainable remains doubtful, but so too is Europe’s contradictory posture of subservience to Washington combined with near-open hostility toward Russia.
Like Ukraine, Europe and Britain must accept direction from their imperial patron: America has resolved that the war must end and is now working to broker agreement with Russia. If this wounds European pride, so be it: the continent will bear the consequences of the weakness imposed by its leaders’ choices. Integrating a shattered postwar Ukraine—whose economy lies in ruins and a quarter of whose people have fled to the EU—into European institutions will be a generational challenge. Equally difficult will be controlling illicit weapons flowing west once combat ceases.
Trump’s self-imposed Thanksgiving deadline for peace has passed. A ceasefire by Christmas would be miraculous. Yet the likely unsatisfactory resolution, and narrow avoidance of significantly worse outcomes, demands sober reflection alien to Westminster politics. Ukrainians understandably have lost trust in Europe’s hollow promises. As Zelensky warned this week, “Ukraine may now face a very difficult choice, either losing its dignity or the risk of losing a key partner, either the difficult 28 points, or a very difficult winter.” If only our own leaders showed such candor. Britain’s competitors grow stronger while our allies’ reliability falters. As the Commons Defence Select Committee cautioned, even Britain’s homeland defense is highly uncertain. Nigel Farage may be fortunate that responsibility for defeat could fall to a Labour prime minister, and that Reform’s foreign policy remains largely undefined: with Mendoza as adviser, this is probably for the best. Historically, defeat often prompts serious national reform. As he prepares for government, Farage should seize this potential pause to map out a swift, feasible path to securing the nation’s fundamental defense and ensuring Britain is never again caught so dangerously between commitments and capabilities.
Original article: unherd.com
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