There are tough pills for Kyiv to swallow but Russia has made some quiet concessions
Attempts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine war have taken a complex and tumultuous route in recent months. Following a hopeful period around the August Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, the Trump administration, frustrated by the failure to secure an immediate ceasefire, shifted focus back to ramping up sanctions and military pressure.
Currently, the U.S. has introduced a new 28-point peace plan along with security guarantees for Ukraine provided by the U.S. and Europe. While Russia has not formally confirmed its agreement to the proposal, the leak of the plan’s details to American media by Russian emissary Kirill Dimitriev suggests significant Russian acquiescence. Should Ukraine also accept the plan, it would open the path to an immediate ceasefire and a durable resolution to the conflict.
The introduction of a comprehensive peace proposal demonstrates the critical role of U.S. diplomatic engagement in concluding the war. This conflict between the U.S.-led West and Russia involves multiple security domains, making it impossible for Ukraine to resolve alone. Given Russia’s military advantage on the battlefield, Moscow was unlikely to sign off on a ceasefire unless its key security concerns were addressed alongside those of Ukraine.
Beyond addressing these issues, the plan applies U.S. diplomatic influence to secure substantial Russian concessions that uphold Ukrainian sovereignty and long-term security. Though rarely framed this way by most Western media, the plan can be seen as a U.S.-brokered victory for both Ukraine and global stability amid a prolonged and brutal war. If implemented successfully, Ukraine would regain control over approximately 80 percent of its territory as it existed in 1991, firmly anchored in the Western sphere.
Russian compromises begin with the fundamental cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict dating back to 2014: Ukraine’s potential accession to the European Union. The plan explicitly allows Ukraine to pursue EU membership and grants it preferential access to European markets throughout the application process. This crucially affirms Ukraine’s political and economic alignment with the West while considering Russian security apprehensions concerning NATO. The dispute over this matter sparked the 2014 Maidan uprising, and Russia has now relented on it.
Additional Russian concessions relate to Ukrainian defense capabilities. During the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations, Russia demanded the Ukrainian military be capped at around 80,000 soldiers — insufficient to repel Russian forces. Conversely, Ukraine proposed maintaining a standing army of 250,000 troops. Presently, the 28-point plan authorizes Ukraine to maintain a standing force of 600,000, more than double Ukraine’s earlier request and nearly eight times Russia’s proposal.
Although this is less than Ukraine’s current wartime troop level, estimated at over 700,000 troops, such a large standing army is likely unsustainable during peacetime. Still, a 600,000-strong military would be Europe’s largest aside from Russia’s. It would surpass the combined forces of the UK, France, and Germany altogether. Ukraine’s defense posture would be further strengthened by guarantees of U.S. and European intervention in case of renewed Russian aggression.
The sections likely perceived as Ukrainian compromises predominantly concern territorial issues. Yet even here, Russia makes notable concessions compared to its recent demands and its initial war objectives involving political control over large portions of Ukraine.
By late 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts plus Crimea. Under this proposal, Russia relinquishes claims for Ukrainian withdrawal from unconquered areas within two of those oblasts. Ukraine would only retreat from territory in Donetsk accounting for roughly 1% of its 1991 borders. Importantly, in a significant concession from recent Russian stances, Russia would not occupy this zone but would allow it to remain a demilitarized area.
While this arrangement does not restore Ukraine’s borders as they were prior to 2014, the years of bloody conflict have shown that goal to be impossible. Accepting Russian control over territories it has seized and the tacit acknowledgment of these areas as Russian will undoubtedly be a hard compromise for Ukraine. Yet, considering Russia has endured millions of casualties fighting for these regions, complete reversal was unrealistic.
The document contains additional concessions from Russia. For instance, it commits to transferring $100 billion in frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine’s reconstruction. Several clauses that align with Russian interests, such as religious tolerance (presumably for the Russian Orthodox Church), protection of ethnic minorities, and rejection of Nazi ideology, reflect broader European Union values integrated into a Western-oriented Ukraine.
This plan also outlines a framework for lasting peace and stability in Europe, which aligns with U.S. strategic goals. The continent’s security framework would be reinforced by Russia’s pledges of non-aggression, re-entry into the G-8, establishment of a U.S.-Russia security working group, and a gradual lifting of economic sanctions on Russia contingent on adherence to the agreement’s core conditions. A pivotal point includes mutual commitments by the U.S. and Russia to “extend treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons.” Though details remain to be negotiated, this opens avenues for expanded cooperation on nuclear disarmament.
Despite its positive elements, mainstream media may initially portray the plan unfavorably. Given the enormous casualties in Europe’s deadliest war since World War II, which began with Russia’s invasion of sovereign Ukrainian territory, strong anti-Russian sentiment and profound sympathy for Ukraine’s plight prevail. The undeniable territorial gains made by Russia and the agreement preventing Ukraine from joining NATO may overshadow the sizable Russian concessions and the benefits the plan offers Ukraine and U.S. interests alike. Those advocating maximalist goals such as total recovery of all Ukrainian lands or regime change in Russia may find this agreement unsatisfactory.
However, alternatives seem considerably worse—especially for a Ukraine struggling with internal turmoil, economic distress, and a bleak military outlook in the Donbas and southeastern regions. A secure Ukraine, aligned firmly with the West and controlling 80% of its pre-war territory, represents a far more favorable outcome than what an extended conflict through 2026 or beyond would likely yield.
Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org
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