With its military strategies depleted and China, Russia, along with key regional players refusing to isolate Tehran, Washington is struggling in a conflict it cannot triumph in. The Iran War Is the Greatest Strategic Blunder in U.S. History
By Joshua Scheer
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described the Trump administration’s latest effort to choke Iran economically as “economic D-Day.” John Mearsheimer, however, calls it what it truly is: a last-ditch, desperate attempt from an empire that has exhausted its military options.
In a conversation with Chris Hedges, the political scientist from the University of Chicago argues that Washington’s plan to sever Iran from international commerce is doomed to fail. Neither China nor Russia will participate, Iran’s regional allies have little motivation to comply, and even allied nations like the United Arab Emirates risk severe repercussions if they align with the campaign. Meanwhile, spiking energy costs, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and growing damage to U.S. military infrastructure have transformed Trump’s promised swift victory into an economic and strategic disaster.
“The reality, Chris, is they’re desperate,” Mearsheimer explains. “They’ve exhausted all military avenues.” Instead of weakening Iran, the conflict has bolstered Tehran’s coercive power and highlighted the limitations of American influence in the Persian Gulf.
John Mearsheimer: The Iran War Is the Greatest Strategic Blunder in U.S. History
Editor’s note: This transcript has been mildly revised for clarity. Obvious transcription mistakes were fixed, and some filler words were omitted, without altering the core content of the dialogue.
Chris Hedges: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has launched an economic pressure strategy targeting Iran, aiming to sever Tehran’s global financial ties. The U.S. intends to block Iran’s revenue streams, including oil, and forbid other nations and businesses from engaging with Iran. The Trump administration has issued warnings demanding countries pick sides: trade with either the U.S. or Iran, with secondary sanctions looming over those who persist in dealing with Iran.
Known as Operation Economic Outcast and called economic D-Day by Bessent himself, this campaign unfolds nearly six months into the conflict ignited by unprovoked U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran. The Treasury Department has sanctioned 60 entities, ships, and individuals worldwide—in places such as the UAE, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, and Switzerland—accusing them of enabling the “Iranian regime’s recklessness.” However, Trump’s effort faces two major setbacks: China and Russia refuse to halt trade with Iran. China alone accounts for about 90% of Iran’s oil imports, and imposing sanctions on Chinese companies risks severe economic retaliation.
Simultaneously, Trump has alienated his allies, whom he now requests to support these sanctions. Iran has faced significant sanctions since the Islamic Republic’s establishment in 1979 and has developed complex networks to bypass them. This latest maneuver reflects the Trump administration’s frustration after depleting military options. What the U.S. hopes to gain from these sanctions remains unclear. Meanwhile, Iran has largely shut down the Strait of Hormuz, a vital energy corridor.
Oil and gas prices have skyrocketed. The economic toll on the U.S., including for food and gasoline, continues mounting. The U.S. has enforced a blockade on Iran and reduced oil shipments but is also escorting some tankers through the strait. It remains uncertain how much oil actually manages to exit—certainly not the 10 million barrels per day claimed by the U.S. Whether welcomed or not, the war has unmistakably strengthened Iran’s hold on power. Joining me to explore this topic is Professor John Mearsheimer, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, a West Point graduate, and former Air Force captain.
He is the author of several works including Conventional Deterrence, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, and Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. John, you have warned from the start that the U.S. lacks a viable exit strategy, yet commentators like Hegseth and Trump have yet to accept this reality and are engaging in a perilous gamble. I’ll hand it over to you.
John Mearsheimer: I believe President Trump has recognized there’s no favorable exit. The Bessent strategy, designed to cripple Iran economically, is essentially a desperate final throw of the dice—a Hail Mary. This is not a good plan. If it were, it would have been initiated much earlier.
Its delayed implementation reflects its poor prospects. Almost everyone, including mainstream media, recognizes this approach’s futility. You correctly noted the refusal of China and Russia to cooperate will likely doom the plan. But there are additional reasons it will fail.
First, the United States and Israel represent an existential threat to Iran. Consequently, Iran will defend itself fiercely. The threshold for their surrender is extraordinarily high because the threat is existential. Moreover, blockades of this nature require considerable time to yield results—time the U.S. does not have, particularly with midterm elections approaching in November. The global economy is also fragile. If the conflict drags on, President Trump risks becoming a figure similar to Herbert Hoover, which he certainly wants to avoid.
The UAE stands out as a significant factor here. Among Iran’s key trading partners, China and the UAE rank high, and while China has been addressed, the UAE presents a complex dilemma. Closely aligned with the U.S. and Israel—and as one of the two Gulf nations that signed the Abraham Accords—the UAE would be expected to support Bessent’s sanctions plan. However, Iran has warned that any UAE cooperation would provoke retaliatory attacks capable of severely crippling the UAE’s functioning.
This places the UAE in a tight spot. While it has strong reasons to side with the U.S., it equally possesses compelling incentives to avoid such alignment. It’s no surprise the Wall Street Journal recently reported no clear evidence that the UAE is fully cooperating with the United States. Considering the UAE along with Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan, and other Iranian trade partners, none has much motivation to comply with a U.S.-led economic strangulation of Iran. Taken together, the prospects for success appear grim.
Chris Hedges: Do you think the Trump administration comprehends the fragility of their position? I worry they may be utterly oblivious.
John Mearsheimer: I don’t believe they are entirely unaware. Someone like Bessent, steeped in financial markets for decades, must grasp the reality. He may sound naive publicly, but privately he understands this is a desperate gamble. They’ve run out of military options.
Initially, it was the U.S. projecting strength, launching extensive air campaigns alongside Israel against Iran. The Iranians, though possessing a military capability, appeared defensive. But today, the Iranians openly discuss offensive military actions, while the U.S. has sidelined military options. The dynamic has reversed, leaving Iran with greater coercive military leverage and the U.S. lacking viable military recourse.
The blockade has been attempted twice—first after the initial air war, temporarily suspended following the June 17th memorandum of understanding, then re-imposed in mid-July. Yet, the blockade failed to be effective, prompting the addition of Bessent’s economic strangulation strategy. Clearly, if this were a solid strategy, it would have been employed earlier. Instead, it is a last-ditch effort amid evident desperation.
People inside the administration responsible for this issue likely recognize this reality. Many outside, even those sympathetic to the administration, accept the chances of success as minimal.
Chris Hedges: Regarding U.S. bases, conditions on the Abraham Lincoln deteriorated as resupply became impossible, and reports suggest Iran devastated port facilities in Bahrain. Their supply chain seems to have rerouted through Diego Garcia, though details remain vague. Overall, Iran has inflicted severe damage on U.S. assets.
John Mearsheimer: The term “assets” fits because it’s not just bases but advanced radar systems integral to our presence that Iranians nearly obliterated. Subsequently, the U.S. moved many military assets, especially aircraft, out of the Gulf to Jordan, which sits outside the Gulf.
When Iran targeted Jordan with missiles, assets shifted to Israel and back to Europe. Maintaining bases and radar infrastructure in the Gulf is unrealistic due to advanced Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. The threat from these weapons continues growing, and defensive measures have proven ineffective.
Defensive missile systems struggle because the cost and effectiveness heavily favor incoming missiles. During last June’s 12-day conflict, the U.S. and Israel faced shortages of defensive missiles while Iran’s offensive stockpiles remained robust, necessitating a ceasefire. Earlier, in February, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs warned President Trump of insufficient defense munitions—a warning unheeded as Trump expected a quick victory that never materialized.
As this protracted conflict drained defensive missile supplies, the air campaign ended after 40 days. Iranian missile forces are only expected to improve, while U.S. countermeasures lag. Attempting to re-establish bases in this environment is unrealistic, leaving the U.S. without a meaningful military foothold in the Persian Gulf—a startling reversal from the status quo in February.
Chris Hedges: Another issue is that interceptor missiles take long to produce.
John Mearsheimer: Absolutely. The cost imbalance is critical. For instance, an incoming Iranian ballistic missile costs roughly between $500,000 and $1 million. A defensive PAC-3 missile costs about $4 million, but since two are needed for reliable defense, actual expenditure per incoming missile is around $8 million. If Iranian missiles lean toward the lower estimate, the cost ratio rises to 16 to 1 against the defenders.
Compounding this, such missile inventory replenishment takes substantial time because these are specialized “boutique” weapons. So production rates don’t meet operational demands, aggravating U.S. defensive shortfalls.
Chris Hedges: And they’ve even depleted global stockpiles.
John Mearsheimer: Certainly. In East Asia, this is alarming, as allies worry about depleted missile defenses. The U.S. has pulled Patriot and THAAD missile systems from Japan and South Korea, and troops have been shifted to the Gulf. The recent swap of the USS Abraham Lincoln for the USS George Washington in the Gulf left no carriers in East Asia, since the George Washington is stationed permanently in Japan.
Japan’s Tomahawk missile purchases have also been delayed due to heavy use in the Persian Gulf conflict, impacting the U.S.’ ability to contain China. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s demand for Patriot missiles remains unmet due to these shortages, illustrating a broader problem of diverting resources between theaters. This situation has global implications.
Chris Hedges: Considering the ongoing conflict, how do you assess its economic ramifications, and where would it stand among U.S. strategic failures?
John Mearsheimer: Without question, even though it’s not fully resolved, this ranks as the greatest strategic blunder in U.S. history. The Council on Foreign Relations previously surveyed historians on America’s most disastrous foreign policy errors, placing the 2003 Iraq War at the top. While that was a monumental mistake, the Iran War surpasses it. It’s shocking how naïve President Trump was to initiate this conflict.
Trump acted under the mistaken belief, heavily influenced by Bibi Netanyahu, that Iran was near acquiring nuclear weapons. That was false—a fact supported by comprehensive evidence and the statements of Rafael Grossi, head of the IAEA, who affirmed Iran neither possesses nor is pursuing nuclear arms.
Netanyahu and Mossad chief David Barnea falsely assured Trump that an air campaign could achieve regime change in Iran—a historically unprecedented and unattainable objective. Despite opposition from top U.S. officials warning against such a course, Trump proceeded.
He neglected the serious threat posed by a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz. During the brief 12-day war in June 2025, it was the U.S. and Israel who sought to end hostilities upon learning Iran might seal off the strait—a mortal danger. Trump ignored contingency planning for a prolonged war or a blockade.
Given these miscalculations—about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the efficacy of bombing campaigns, and the Strait—the war constitutes a first-rate blunder. Unlike Iraq, where Saddam Hussein was deposed, in Iran the U.S. has achieved none of its four declared objectives:
1. Eliminating Iran’s nuclear enrichment: Now appearing even further from resolution, with the prospect of renewed nuclear talks bleak.
2. Destroying Iran’s long-range missile program: Instead, Iranian missile capabilities have grown stronger.
3. Severing Iran’s ties to groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas: The opposite has occurred, as Iran demands ceasefires with these groups to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
4. Regime change: A complete failure.
Moreover, Iran now controls the Strait more firmly, the U.S. basing network lies in ruins, regional alliances are fractured, and an economic crisis looms that threatens Trump’s presidency. It’s hard to imagine a more disastrous war.
Chris Hedges: The U.S. has drawn down its strategic petroleum reserves to levels akin to the early 1980s, and commercial oil companies, benefiting from soaring fuel prices, have also lowered their stockpiles. Given inflation and the escalating cost of fuel and food, what might be the economic fallout if this standoff persists?
John Mearsheimer: It’s difficult to precisely assess how close we are to a crisis. Estimates vary on when the oil reserves might be critically depleted, ranging from a few weeks to several months away. Oil export figures from the Gulf are uncertain, despite U.S. reports. Alternate routes through the Red Sea, previously mitigating some supply issues, are increasingly compromised.
Chinese oil demand reductions have helped offset shortages, but as their consumption begins to rise again, risks increase. Multiple variables affect the global situation, making exact predictions challenging. Most analysts agree that unless the conflict subsides soon, the situation will deteriorate sharply, especially with winter’s approach and looming food shortages.
President Trump’s signing of the June 17th memorandum of understanding—widely viewed as a surrender document—reflected his recognition of the gravity of the situation. Despite better intelligence within his administration, they understand the urgency to resolve this crisis, hence the current desperate economic strangulation strategy—the Hail Mary pass.
Chris Hedges: Diesel prices have doubled, impacting farming equipment and transportation. Ukraine’s agricultural exports, vital for Europe, are hindered, compounded by fertilizer shortages transported largely through the Strait of Hormuz. Can you elaborate on possible food security implications?
John Mearsheimer: Roughly a third of the world’s fertilizer originates from the Gulf, and spring planting suffered due to reduced shipments, affecting expected harvests. Drought conditions in Europe and beyond exacerbate this. Russian strikes on Black Sea ports block critical Ukrainian grain exports, effectively landlocking the country. Ukraine’s naval attacks on Russian vessels further constrain Russian grain exports. Combined, these factors anticipate significant food price increases alongside fuel costs, worsening the global economy.
Chris Hedges: Inflation.
John Mearsheimer: Inflation naturally follows supply shortages. Reduced availability of wheat and grain boosts prices. Rising diesel costs, crucial for farm operations and transport, compound this effect, independently driving food prices higher even before diminished production impacts manifest.
Chris Hedges: Some warn of an economic collapse or global depression. Is this an overstatement?
John Mearsheimer: Not so far. Oil supply disruptions have been mitigated somewhat by factors like China’s reduced consumption, global release of strategic reserves, and alternative Saudi and UAE export routes. Damage has been softened but not averted. Predicting economic futures involves radical uncertainty, making precise forecasts difficult.
Still, global leaders like Trump seek to avoid economic disasters, hence attempts to end hostilities. The June memorandum showed an awareness of precarious circumstances. Both Trump and Bessent are likely aware of the urgency, recognizing this as a desperation move. The question remains: if this Hail Mary fails, what next?
Chris Hedges: Some, including Netanyahu and Trump, have hinted at using tactical nuclear weapons. Would that resolve anything?
John Mearsheimer: Nuclear options are off the table. Military approaches have failed, including strategic bombing and blockades. Tactical nukes have been widely dismissed by advisors as implausible and counterproductive. Though Trump reportedly considered the idea, experts advise strongly against it.
The realistic options are capitulation—potentially negotiating under harsher Iranian terms—or continuing the current trajectory, hoping for an improbable turnaround, though risking catastrophic failure. Trump’s character suggests he is unlikely to admit defeat easily or meet Iranian demands. Returning to military force is improbable, and nuclear options make no strategic sense, as they risk escalating proliferation and devastating consequences without resolving the conflict.
This discussion reinforces the view of this war as America’s greatest strategic error: no viable path to victory exists, all objectives remain unmet, and control of key strategic assets and alliances has been lost.
Chris Hedges: To conclude, the U.S. has become a pariah. It seems many countries worldwide are rooting for Iran.
John Mearsheimer: Absolutely. Many see the U.S. as an overbearing bully and wish to see it humbled. Russia and China have strategic incentives to support Iran’s success, considering the U.S. a mortal threat. Likewise, Turkey favors an Iranian victory to avoid becoming the next Israeli target, as Israel openly views Turkey as a future adversary.
Across the Middle East, including Gulf states and even the UAE, Israel is increasingly seen as a rogue power aiming to dominate the region and destabilize other states. Because Israel and the U.S. are closely linked, fearing Israel equates to fearing the United States. From a Gulf state perspective, the American flag is seen alongside the Israeli flag—a formidable alliance.
Consequently, many regional actors prefer to see the U.S. humbled. This is complex, as Gulf states remain wary of Iran, but when weighing threats, it’s unclear whether Iran or the U.S. poses the greater danger, especially given the close U.S.-Israel tandem.
Historically, Iran has not initiated an attack on another country since its modern inception, contrasting starkly with Israel’s aggressive actions, including committing genocide in Gaza. While Iran’s regime may be disliked, it is neither an apartheid state nor a perpetrator of genocide. The U.S., tightly allied with Israel, embodies a different and more aggressive posture.
In summary, many Gulf states may view Iran as a lesser threat than the U.S., considering the intertwined U.S.-Israeli alliance the more significant danger.
Chris Hedges: Thank you, John. I also want to acknowledge Max and Melina, who produced this program. You can find me at chrisedges.substack.com.
John Mearsheimer: Thank you, Chris.
Original article: scheerpost.com
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