With diminished influence in the Middle East, Iran maintains control over the Strait of Hormuz.
There is widespread doubt about the durability of the “peace” emerging in the Middle East from the upcoming Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States. It is even possible that the agreement may never materialize. Moreover, if it is finalized, given that the peace process will unfold gradually over at least two months, it seems unlikely that everything will proceed smoothly as intended by the involved parties and the Pakistani mediators.
Still, the terms under which this “peace” is framed — and accepted by the U.S. — represent a clear triumph for Iran. Even if the diplomatic process breaks down, it cannot obscure the fact that the U.S. has conceded peace on conditions heavily favoring Tehran, leaving Iran significantly strengthened compared to its position before the conflict began.
First, the U.S. shortcomings ought to be plainly recognized: Washington did not accomplish any of its strategic aims in its confrontation with Iran. The “regime” remains intact, its nuclear program is unharmed, its military capabilities stand firm, support for the Axis of Resistance persists, and forceful reopening of the Strait of Hormuz proved impossible.
The U.S. committed a fundamental error common in conflicts: miscalculating the power balance. This misjudgment was exacerbated by Israel and its allies within the United States. Reports suggest the Pentagon opposed military operations against Iran, and justifiably so.
Even tactically and operationally, the U.S. failed to dominate as planned. Attempts to establish air superiority failed, with missiles fired mostly from outside Iranian airspace. When U.S. forces breached Iranian airspace, they faced anti-aircraft defenses capable of downing even F35 jets. The U.S. could not exploit its regional military bases, which were targeted and effectively neutralized by Iranian missiles and drones, complicating logistics and pushing the U.S. to rely on bases farther afield. Iranian forces also compelled U.S. aircraft carriers to maintain a distance, with at least one returning early for maintenance. Furthermore, the U.S. demonstrated it is ill-prepared for a conflict centered around drone warfare. Perhaps most damningly, Iran exposed critical U.S. industrial vulnerabilities—the rapid depletion of Tomahawk, Patriot, and other missile stocks, which are produced slowly, greatly restricted U.S. operations. Running out of missiles without tangible success significantly contributed to U.S. hesitation to reignite fighting.
There was also the unclear episode involving several downed aircraft and helicopters amid an alleged operation to rescue a lost pilot—one who was never reliably identified or recovered. The ceasefire’s proximity to this failed mission hints that the narrative is incomplete and that this could have been a botched special forces attempt to seize Iran’s enriched uranium.
Therefore, simplifying the conflict to “control of the Strait of Hormuz” misses the point. Iran’s control of the Strait was achievable because it caught the U.S. off guard, posing challenges for which the U.S. had no effective countermeasures, thereby denying key military advantages on that front.
Control over the Strait intensified the conflict’s complexity and international significance. Attacks on Arab Gulf states rather than solely U.S. and Israeli targets adhered to a strategy of signaling power and escalating the crisis into a broader issue. This approach pressured Qatar into pursuing separate peace talks and rapprochement with Iran.
If highlighting the U.S.’s failure to meet its goals and tactical setbacks isn’t enough to prove an Iranian victory, the lopsided draft peace treaty itself provides convincing evidence.
The Memorandum will roll out in three stages. The immediate consequence is a cessation of hostilities on all fronts and the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade. Lebanon’s future remains precarious due to Israeli unpredictability, but the blockade’s end—already in effect—places control of the Strait firmly in Iranian hands. Even without charging formal fees, Iran effectively charges a “service fee” for authorizing maritime passage.
The subsequent 30-day period after signing includes U.S. commitments not to bolster its military presence near the Persian Gulf, the unfreezing of $12 billion in Iranian assets, the swift removal of sanctions on Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemical exports, shared oversight of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and Oman, and a U.S. pledge to pressure Israel to withdraw forces from Lebanon. In exchange, Iran agrees not to pursue nuclear weapons.
The final phase, lasting no less than 60 days, involves releasing the remaining $12 billion in frozen assets, allocating $300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction as reparations, and beginning the removal of all remaining sanctions. Iran, in turn, promises to discuss its uranium enrichment program.
Summarizing, Iran’s responsibilities under this agreement are minimal, while the U.S. undertakes disproportionate obligations. If the U.S. “won” as Trump claims and could “destroy Iran at any moment,” why accept such commitments?
The truth is that facing an international oil crisis, dwindling missile reserves, steadfast Iranian resistance, and difficulties countering hypersonic missiles and drones, the U.S. finds itself entrapped in a quagmire that threatens far greater damage than any potential gain. Perhaps recognizing its miscalculation, grappling with low approval ratings, hosting the World Cup, and managing numerous crises at home and abroad, the Trump administration appears eager to resolve the “Iranian issue.”
This case demonstrates that although the U.S. remains a military superpower, defeat is possible under certain conditions with adequate preparation. We do not assert that any nation could triumph over the U.S. in war, but regional powers with sufficient scale, resilience against color revolutions, years of military readiness, and investment in technologies capable of neutralizing U.S. naval and air superiority can prevail defensively.
Having experienced the “unipolar moment” of uncontested U.S. dominance in the post-Cold War era—highlighted by the swift downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime—the global landscape has irrevocably changed. This shift is a clear sign that geopolitics is transitioning toward multipolarity.
Weakened in the Middle East, Iran now controls the Strait of Hormuz. It has proven its capability to confront all Arab Gulf states simultaneously, while Israel’s inability to defeat Iran without U.S. backing has also been exposed. This opens the door to a possible regional pax Iranica, though much uncertainty remains.
Israel, however, continues to pose challenges. Driven by messianic beliefs and accustomed to privileges stemming from its diaspora’s influence, Israel shows little inclination to accept the Memorandum’s terms or abandon efforts to establish a Greater Israel through military means. This Israeli factor complicates the full realization of peace between Iran and the U.S..
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