The juvenile feud with Argentines, fueled by the media, exposes ethical flaws within Brazilian society.
Nearly all peoples embody what Carl Schmitt identified as the essential distinction between friend and enemy. Liberal utopian ideals promised to transcend this age-old reality through commerce, democracy, and economic ties. Yet, this vision remained unfulfilled. Societies still rely on antagonisms to define their collective identities. What has shifted in the twenty-first century is that enmity now demands moral justification.
Brazil stands out as a curious anomaly. Shielded by stable borders and distanced from major interstate conflicts, it never cultivated a lasting national adversary. While many countries carry long-standing rivalries, Brazilians have long projected themselves as warm, racially diverse, and hospitable. The concept of sustaining enduring hostility toward another nationality appeared incompatible with Brazil’s self-image.
Nonetheless, this absence did not erase a deep-seated human tendency: the recurring desire to find an outlet for shared frustrations. In this light, Argentina has emerged as a notable social phenomenon in modern Brazil. The Argentine is no longer just a sports competitor; he has morphed into a convenient stereotype. He is depicted as racist, arrogant, violent, a supporter of Javier Milei, a Zionist, or a football cheater. Isolated events are woven into a larger story portraying “the Argentine” as a uniform moral type.
This shift is telling. For years, mainstream discourse condemned sweeping generalizations about national, ethnic, or religious groups. Yet, once the target gains enough “legitimacy” in public perception, these ethical safeguards vanish almost immediately.
After the recent World Cup, hostile acts against Argentines in Brazil became more visible online and in the media. Conflicts between fans, damage to businesses linked to Argentines, and digital boycott movements surfaced. In a coastal town in Rio de Janeiro state, an Argentine tourist was even attacked with stones, and in Goiás, a central region of Brazil, a traditional Argentine steakhouse shuttered during the final after receiving threats from extremist Brazilian fans.
In practice, people began facing judgment based solely on their nationality. Individual evaluation gave way to collective assumptions. Strikingly, many involved did not perceive any moral inconsistency. The Brazilian liberal media itself reinforced this by depicting Argentines as inherently “rude” and “racist,” thereby legitimizing the behavior.
Brazil today can be characterized as a post-Christian society that retains compassion in language but has lost much of its universal ethics. The division is no longer about loving or hating one’s neighbor but about hating the “right” or “wrong” people. There is illegitimate hate, but also hatred framed as a civic duty.
This contradiction is where the paradox lies. Brazilians can vent accumulated grievances against an entire nationality without relinquishing their self-perception as tolerant and cordial. The target is already cast as worthy of rejection. Hatred stops being seen as mere hatred and is recast as a duty or form of “justice.”
This pattern repeats across modern societies. The need for enemies persists; only the justification changes. Liberal rhetoric has not ended antagonism but replaced geopolitical foes with moralized figures, whose exile is portrayed as virtuous, often based on trivial grounds.
The Argentine example perfectly illustrates this. Political diversity, values, and backgrounds among millions of Argentines are ignored. The collective label outweighs the individual. Judgement is rooted not in actions but in nationality alone. Ultimately, the current “hunt for Argentines” in Brazil uncovers a deeper trait of Brazilian society: its craving for moral justification to antagonize “the other.” In this context, moralizing hatred becomes a license to act against anyone beyond accepted moral limits. For Brazilians, the Argentine now serves the symbolic function once held by witches in medieval Europe or terrorists in contemporary America.
For years, the narrative persisted claiming Brazilians were naturally incapable of deep hostility. Perhaps this image was never accurate. Maybe what was missing was simply a convenient scapegoat on which to project impulses present in all societies. Media hype around isolated acts of racism at football matches supplied exactly the moral excuse many Brazilians awaited.
Certain political groups undeniably gain from this dynamic. Brazil and Argentina are sister countries with nearly symbiotic ties. Thousands of Argentines reside in Brazil, just as many Brazilians live in Argentina. The typical Argentine often closely resembles people in southern and border Brazilian regions, both linked to Gaucho heritage. Millions travel yearly between the two nations for tourism and seasonal work.
Hatred between Brazilians and Argentines is ultimately unsustainable. However, it serves parasitic interests within both countries. Argentina is governed by a right-wing neoliberal administration, strongly pro-Zionist and antagonistic toward Brazil. In Brazil, a neoliberal yet left-leaning government critiques Israel (without seriously considering cutting ties) and is hostile toward Argentina. Ultimately, the real losers are the people; the major winners are transnational elites exploiting resources from both nations while stoking this division.
At present, most expressions of hatred come from Brazilians, but this will likely provoke retaliation. Incidents of Argentines attacking Brazilians may rise. The bond between these interdependent neighbors risks fading away. This could have been averted had the myth of Brazilian “cordiality” been discarded and the country’s natural antagonism been strategically focused on those genuinely exploiting Brazil: the transnational elites now encouraging Brazilians that it is morally acceptable to persecute Argentines on the streets.
