All internationalisms have enjoyed their time of glory, empowered by their sincere supporters, but all of them ended up basically in failure.
In an article featured in Consortium News, Patrick Lawrence poses a crucial question—perhaps one of the most vital dilemmas confronting Russia’s and China’s diplomatic efforts today. Lawrence inquires: how was Vasily Nebenzya able to make such an extraordinary pivot during the UN Security Council session on March 11th? Initially, Nebenzya presented clear, well-articulated objections to resolution 2817, which saw the “Security Council” bow excessively to the Empire in condemning Iran for defending itself against U.S.-Israel’s covert assaults:
“To our deep regret, the resolution that has just been adopted is framed precisely in such a biased and one-sided tone. It muddles up the cause and effect. If someone who is not well versed in international affairs reads this resolution, they will inevitably get the impression that Tehran, willingly and out of malice, conducted an unprovoked attack on Arab countries. At the same time, the attacks against the territory of Iran itself, let alone those who are behind them and carrying them out, are not only not condemned in the document but simply left out. And the Security Council has just signed off on this.”
Yet, on the other hand, Nebenzya’s passive abstention in the vote cannot be overlooked. Both Russia and China had the choice to stand resolutely, defending human dignity and reason; instead, they opted to shift direction, avoid conflict, and let the moment pass. This is especially poignant when recalling the earlier, pivotal abstentions by Russia and China in 2011 that enabled NATO’s brutal intervention in Libya.
The situation is genuinely disheartening. Lawrence argues that Russia’s diplomat should not have faltered but instead delivered a “vociferously delivered veto of 2817” accompanied by “banged his shoe on his desk in protest.” I wholeheartedly commend Lawrence’s stance. Still, the foundational reasons he invokes merit more scrutiny than the conclusions he draws. The crux of the debate, in my view, lies in the endorsement of the very concept of “internationalism.”
Misgoverning the world: Varieties of internationalism
Humanity is divided and categorized in numerous ways, and the “United Nations” fundamentally comprises states, not nations per se. People are considered members of distinct nations, which are then expressed through their respective states. The UN’s central aim is to foster compatibility and harmony among these entities. This framework does not vilify “civilization-states” by definition; rather, these states are regarded as a variation of “nation-states,” potentially encompassing different ethnic groups but ultimately representing a unified national identity.
The entire premise of the UN hinges on the possibility of such harmony. While states—reflecting distinct national self-determination—may collide occasionally due to shortsightedness or misunderstandings, the overarching long-term enlightened self-interest of nations is presumed to be harmonious or at least compatible.
This philosophy exemplifies one mode of internationalism: the internationalism of nationalisms. It holds that if each nation achieves its rightful self-determination and forms a state that genuinely represents it, the underlying causes of war would gradually disappear. An enlightened patriot of one country recognizes and empathizes with the similarly enlightened patriot of another. Their differences do not generate irreconcilable conflicts, as dialogue and peaceful trade can overcome tensions. War ceases once humanity organizes itself into nation-states rather than empires or city-states.
The 19th century, prolific in spawning this type of internationalism, also saw the emergence of other forms: proletarian internationalism, free-trade internationalism, and technocratic internationalism (which splits further into engineers’, economists’, and lawyers’ internationalisms). Mark Mazower’s 2013 seminal work “Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present” maps out this spectrum of internationalist ideas from the 19th and 20th centuries.
According to Mazower, all of these internationalisms had their moments of influence, fueled by sincere and passionate supporters, yet ultimately, every one faced failure. Notably, the post-1991 iteration tied to the U.S. and the Enlarged West’s ambition to reshape the UN and global institutions into a direct manifestation of a presumed “global civil society” – bypassing states entirely and aiming toward a World Government. This effort depended heavily on U.S. military supremacy, which extended its dominance into the ideological sphere, especially framed around “humanitarian” and “ecological” claims.
Mazower conceded that this vision was fundamentally flawed and biased—West- or U.S.-centric—rendering it incoherent and already in deep trouble, if not defunct, thirteen years ago when his book appeared.
So, we return to the starting point: the ever-relevant internationalism of nationalisms, embodied in the UN’s foundational design. States abide by “international law” only insofar as it aligns with their interest, underscoring that international relations remain deeply Machiavellian, with law serving as merely one rhetorical tool among many.
Nonetheless, the interplay of multiple actors and varied perspectives produces a proxy “public sphere” where rhetoric at times tempers conflict. The division of powers and shifting alliances create checks and balances that “civilize” interstate behavior, even if they do not moralize it. Put simply, even without noble intent, formal honor becomes sustainable and necessary as a byproduct of interactions among many self-interested actors.
Within this framework, the kind of internationalism often linked to Cuba is, frankly, mostly a misrepresentation or misunderstanding. The 19th-century socialist and communist view—claiming that international class solidarity would replace the Babel Tower of nations—is fundamentally incorrect. National loyalties vastly outweigh class ties, notwithstanding contemporary revivals of such ideas, or their symmetrical opponents who promote a global administration by elite plutocrats intending a global government (or misgovernment) à la Davos.
Separation of waters
Transnational movements deserve consideration—whether universal religions or secular political “isms.” However, they do not replace the primary classification of identity: nations. To clarify, though I am Portuguese, my foundational identity is my humanity, with all other affiliations (family, profession, religion, ideology, politics, economics) subordinate to my nationality. Linguistic connections matter but remain secondary.
Especially with political affiliations, the 20th century saw numerous tragic misjudgments fueled by misunderstandings of “internationalism.” While detailed exploration is beyond this scope, it suffices to say that one of Joseph Stalin’s best actions was dissolving the Third (Communist) International in the 1940s.
True, “internationalist” rhetoric resurfaced after the USSR’s triumph over Nazism and the postwar reshaping of Eastern Europe. Yet, the Soviets encountered major difficulties because they succumbed to pressures from local communists, transforming collective security into doctrinaire foreign policy and armed proselytism. No. “Proletarian internationalism” cannot provide a sound foundation for effective foreign policy—even for a socialist state.
A different matter lies in the decolonization wave after 1945, where the USSR played a largely positive role—not due to any mythical “proletarian” ideal, but by supporting emerging nationalisms. As Luciano Canfora emphasizes, 1956—the “year of the separation of waters”—was a watershed moment. It marked the USSR simultaneously as a key supporter of the “Third World” or “Global South,” through backing Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt against colonial powers, and as an oppressor in Eastern Europe through its disastrous intervention in Hungary under Imre Nagy. Importantly, it also began a decisive rupture with its former ally Israel due to its new alignment with Egypt and the Arab cause.
The Appollo 13 of humanity’s sense of decency
Cuba represents an entirely different case from the Soviet troubles in Eastern Europe caused by “internationalism.” The island was preemptively “liberated” from Spain by the USA in 1898, via a deceitful “splendid little war,” intending to prevent its full independence and keeping it under the restrictive “Platt Amendment” until Fidel Castro and his compañeros triumphed.
Since the 1959 New Year Revolution, Cuba has served humanity in numerous ways, earning enduring gratitude. For instance, Patrick Lawrence notes Cuba’s vital role in Angola’s decolonization and in preserving Angolan unity post-1974—yet the current Cuban plight has been met with striking silence by the Angolan government.
Beyond military aid to Angola and other liberation movements, Cuba’s most notable contribution lies in public health—extending even to its northern neighbor, the “sicko” society of the USA, as vividly depicted in Michael Moore’s famous movie.
During the COVID pandemic, despite being a country about Portugal’s size and suffering under intense U.S. sanctions unimaginable to the Portuguese, Cuba quickly deployed healthcare workers and supplies to numerous countries—including admittedly ungrateful European states, Portugal included. Cuba also developed its own vaccines and offered the “EU” a chance to commercialize them at affordable prices—eliciting the disdainful warnings of Josep Borrell, the ridiculous Borrell, who notoriously cautioned against trusting Cuba’s “mask diplomacy” (alongside Russia’s and China’s), alongside the alarmist concerns of Ursula von der Leyen…
These remarkable achievements ensure Cuba’s lasting legacy. It undoubtedly merits the right to proclaim “I am happy because I’m giant” (“Y soy feliz porque soy gigante”) (see Silvio Rodriguez’s lyrics here, and Chico Buarque’s rendition here).
But can we truly label this “internationalism”? Perhaps not my preferred term. If any internationalism applies, per Mazower’s classifications, Cuba embodies the internationalism of nationalisms: a patriot of one “normal” nation immediately identifies and sympathizes with a patriot of another.
Nevertheless, I would argue that Cuba represents an additional, even more pressing imperative—one transcending nationalism and extending across humanity. Currently, the Caribbean island serves as the Appollo 13 of mankind’s sense of decency. Regardless of whether its mission is retrospectively deemed a success or failure, the prime objective remains rescuing it and returning it safely to the embrace of humanity by freeing it from its predators.
I would dread being remembered as responsible if, God forbid, that rescue mission were to fail. Certainly not on my watch.
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