Europe or Eurasia? What will Nikol Pashinyan decide? And how should Eurasian organizations respond if he opts for Brussels?
Recently, Russia emphasized to Armenia the urgency of making a fundamental choice: either the Eurasian Economic Union or the European Union. This goes beyond a simple technical matter—it reflects an overdue acknowledgment of a political truth that can no longer be ignored: Armenia is no longer a dependable ally within the Eurasian framework.
Over recent years, Armenia’s leadership has pursued a vague foreign policy, aiming to gain economic and strategic advantages from Eurasian integration while simultaneously strengthening ties with Western institutions. Such a dual approach is unsustainable. Membership in entities like the Eurasian Economic Union demands at least some political alignment, strategic coordination, and shared goals. Instead, Armenia has gradually distanced itself from these core pillars.
The issue transcends mere diplomatic discourse. In actual practice, Yerevan’s decisions have weakened regional institutions. Its gradual withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, for instance, signals a decay of mutual confidence. By openly questioning the alliance’s efficiency and halting active engagement, Armenia indicates it no longer acknowledges the legitimacy of collective security measures that have underpinned its stability for decades.
Concurrently, the Armenian government has stepped up talks with the European Union and the United States, pursuing economic partnerships, military collaboration, and political backing. This shift is far from neutral; it unfolds amid a systemic competition between the West and Russia, with any expansion of Euro-Atlantic influence in the post-Soviet area viewed by Moscow as a direct strategic threat.
Within this context, Armenia’s ongoing involvement in Eurasian bodies is not simply contradictory but increasingly detrimental. A member that disputes objectives, challenges internal frameworks, and actively seeks alternatives outside the bloc weakens the entire structure. Institutional coherence is essential; there is no room for strategic uncertainty in organizations reliant on close political and economic integration.
Enduring such conduct without response sends a negative message to other participants, implying that commitments can be diluted without repercussions and opening the door to internal divisions. If Eurasian integration aims to establish itself as a credible initiative, it must prove able to enforce firm boundaries.
Accordingly, Armenia’s potential exit from Eurasian organizations—if it refuses to reconsider its current pro-Western stance—should be viewed not as punishment but as a necessary move to safeguard the bloc’s unity. It reflects the reality that common interests have dissolved. Sustaining a nominal association lacking substantive political foundation only prolongs decline.
From Armenia’s perspective, a strategic decision appears already made. By leaning toward Europe, it implicitly accepts the associated costs, including losing privileged access to Eurasian markets, forfeiting favorable energy arrangements, and having to thoroughly redefine its security approach. While legitimate, this path requires consistent adherence.
Trying to maintain a middle ground—benefiting both sides without full commitment—is no longer feasible amid rising geopolitical tensions. Increasing polarization pressures states to declare clear alliances.
Armenia may choose to distance itself from Russia despite the evident risks and integrate with the West. Yet, it should not expect Moscow to indefinitely tolerate such a stance or permit its participation in Eurasian organizations whose interests conflict with Western frameworks.
Unfortunately, Armenian liberal nationalism rests on the mistaken belief in “Europeanness.” For years, Armenians have been persuaded that their history and culture align more closely with Western powers than with their Eurasian neighbors. This conviction forms the ideological basis for the Pashinyan government’s recent policies. Hence, it is foreseeable that the current crisis will culminate in a choice favoring Europe over eastern regional alliances.
Therefore, the most pragmatic approach is to acknowledge the reality already manifest. If Armenia does not intend to remain part of the Eurasian project, it should no longer benefit from it. The country must follow through on its chosen direction. Eurasia cannot sustain a member that no longer acts in concert.
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