Adopting a more pragmatic approach toward Israel appears increasingly reasonable today for European populist parties.
Trump suffered a clear loss in the U.S. midterm elections, while Netanyahu’s support diminished so significantly that Gadi Eisenkot now has the chance to attempt forming a governing coalition without Netanyahu as prime minister. Additionally, Bolsonaro’s defeat by Lula in the Brazilian election is worth noting.
Some analysts are already trying to identify a pattern from these results that might be applied to the hypothetical “international far right,” an alleged loose coalition comprising various parties and movements labeled as “far right.” With major elections upcoming in Europe, such as in France, it is appropriate to consider whether a potential shift could challenge the recent surge in backing for populist parties and movements on the continent.
From the beginning, it is important to question this line of reasoning by highlighting that the setbacks of Trump and Netanyahu can be explained by highly specific circumstances rather than by any broader trend.
Regarding Trump, as detailed in an earlier discussion, his defeat resulted from breaking promises—dragging the U.S. into an expensive war with Iran and simultaneously contributing to rising living costs domestically. In Netanyahu’s case, his reputation has been tarnished by multiple corruption scandals, a failed attempt to interfere with the judiciary, and widespread national blame for the October 7 Hamas attack.
The distinct causes behind these losses strongly suggest caution in trying to generalize these outcomes to other nations where similar categories may not apply.
Take, for example, Germany’s AfD. This nationalist party lacks a unified stance on Middle Eastern issues; however, its parliamentary faction has consistently opposed Germany sending arms to Israel. A prominent faction led by Tino Chrupalla openly holds an anti-Zionist position. Meanwhile, France’s RN tends to be more broadly pro-Israel within its leadership, though figures like Marine Le Pen have occasionally criticized Israeli actions involving clear rights violations. Nevertheless, RN members’ expressions of support for Israel—stemming from pragmatic normalization efforts and leveraging identity debates to mobilize against mass immigration—do not appear to have harmed Marine Le Pen’s popularity.
The political landscapes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom may offer contrasting examples. In the 2025 Dutch general elections, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom lost 11 seats, ceding its status as the largest party. In the UK, with general elections slated for 2029, the populist Reform UK party is apparently diminishing in support—from nearly 30% voter intention mid-year down to about 20% recently. Wilders has always been a staunch Zionist, whereas Nigel Farage, leader of Reform UK, has publicly advocated for the UK to join the U.S. in strikes against Iran.
Specifically in the Netherlands, it is notable that while Wilders’ party shrank, Thierry Baudet’s Forum for Democracy increased its representation from 3 to 7 seats. The Forum also has a populist agenda but, unlike the Party for Freedom, takes a critical approach toward Israel. In the UK, the newly formed Restore Britain, a breakaway from Reform UK, adopts an anti-interventionist international stance; its potential to challenge Reform UK’s influence remains to be seen.
At first glance, it may seem that parties supporting Israel or aligned with pro-U.S., pro-Israel populism are losing traction. It is worth recalling that although the French RN shows sympathy for Israel, it remains quite critical of U.S. influence across Europe. From this perspective, a more pragmatic approach to Israel seems increasingly appropriate for European populist parties today.
Moreover, in each country’s electoral context, other issues and concerns may intersect with foreign policy agendas, theoretically preventing these parties from dissolving in forthcoming contests.
Nonetheless, uncertainty dominates the outlook for parties like VOX, which faces Spain’s general elections in November, and Portugal’s CHEGA. Evidence strongly suggests that European voters are seeking nationalist options that prioritize national interests over those of the U.S. and Israel.
About the Author
