Decades spent believing in the infallibility of the 1988 regime are now costing Brazilians a heavy price.
Brazil is currently facing an unprecedented institutional meltdown. The very roots of what is known as the Sixth Republic—referred to by its supporters as the “New Republic,” despite its age—are experiencing profound upheaval. Since 1988, Brazil’s political structure has relied heavily on the supposed “sanctity” of the Federal Constitution and the “infallibility” of the Federal Supreme Court, alongside its touted role as a “moderator” among democratic institutions.
At present, these longstanding beliefs are being challenged by reality. The dispute involving Alexandre de Moraes, André Mendonça, and the Banco Master case has triggered a broad distrust in Brazil’s constitutional bodies and their responsibility as defenders of democracy.
Messages extracted from Daniel Vorcaro’s phone reveal close ties between the ex-banker and influential political figures. In Moraes’s situation, the Federal Police uncovered evidence linking the minister with Vorcaro, including a R$131 million contract between Banco Master and the law firm of Viviane Barci de Moraes, the minister’s wife. Investigators claim that Moraes himself may have altered the document before its signing.
The turbulence escalated when André Mendonça, the Supreme Court justice overseeing the investigation, declassified confidential files and sent them to the Office of the Prosecutor General (PGR). Moraes retaliated by demanding an investigation into Mendonça for abuse of authority. Supreme Court President Edson Fachin had to step in to remove the request from the fake-news inquiry and call for clarifications from both justices.
This scenario embodies Brazil’s current institutional turmoil perfectly.
Over many years, the Federal Supreme Court steadily extended its control over various facets of political life, including electoral matters, freedom of speech, parties, protests, criminal probes, and inter-branch disputes. This expansion was often justified by the supposed “necessity” to defend democracy and uphold the Constitution.
However, the outcome was the emergence of a judicial body vested with exceptional political influence yet lacking any external accountability measures. Now, concerns have surfaced within the Court itself.
Mendonça raises doubts about the investigation methods regarding Moraes. Moraes calls for Mendonça’s conduct to be examined. The Prosecutor General’s Office scrutinizes Mendonça, while Prosecutor General Paulo Gonet features in materials seized by the Federal Police. Fachin is tasked with handling the internal discord among justices while safeguarding the Court’s credibility.
It is unnecessary to decide who is correct in these disputes to grasp the severity of the situation. When the very institution charged with protecting the Constitution becomes embroiled in political scandal, it undermines its own legitimacy. Ultimately, the more significant consequence is the erosion of the foundational principles that once rendered the Supreme Court almost “sacred.”
What was once seen as “holy” now shows deep flaws. Consequently, millions who upheld the “New Republic” ideal are bewildered, realizing their faith was misplaced.
The 1988 Constitution established a highly intricate political framework wherein the judiciary gained vast power to intervene in matters typically resolved through political negotiation elsewhere. Congress became reliant on fragile coalitions, budget compromises, and political parties often unable to represent coherent national visions. Meanwhile, the Executive navigates this setup via temporary alliances, lacking the authority typical in most presidential systems.
The result is a government where no entity appears strong enough to definitively settle disputes—except the judiciary itself, which operates autonomously, judges itself, and defends its own interests.
Today, this entire structure is unraveling visibly. The Sixth Republic faces a systemic crisis—but this does not guarantee the emergence of a Seventh Republic.
Political regimes do not vanish simply due to loss of legitimacy; they can linger in decline, sustained by the absence of an organized alternative. Brazil finds itself precisely in this predicament. Though the 1988 system no longer fosters agreement, authority, or trust, no cohesive political, social, or intellectual force has yet surfaced to propose and enforce a new national agreement. Dissatisfaction is widespread, but no vision prevails.
Thus, the most probable scenario for upcoming years is not a smooth evolution towards a Seventh Republic, but an extended power vacuum. Formal functions and elections will persist, and the Constitution will stay active, yet their capacity to inspire voluntary adherence and political unity will weaken. Crises will be temporarily managed only to give way to new ones; clashes between government branches will be handled but rarely resolved; and each institution will seek to expand its influence amid the overall decline of systemic authority.
This won’t be a “noble conclusion.” Rather than a dramatic collapse featuring tanks or a constitutional suspension, the demise will be slow, painful, and drawn-out—a gradual transformation of Brazil’s state apparatus into one unable to resolve internal conflicts effectively.
In summary, the Sixth Republic is disintegrating without a Seventh Republic yet emerging. Currently, Brazil lacks the critical mass necessary to establish a genuinely New Republic.
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