The House of Saud is targeting Ansarallah to safeguard the death cult in West Asia, Pepe Escobar writes.
Let’s begin with some exclusive information. On Thursday, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, the speaker of the Sana’a-based House of Representatives under Ansarallah, handed a letter to Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, requesting that Pakistan act as a mediator between Ansarallah and Riyadh.
Ra’i, who has held the speaker position in Sana’a since 2008 and is highly regarded, delivered this message to Sadiq, who started his current term as speaker in Islamabad in March 2024. This parliamentary-level exchange represents a crucial diplomatic opening amid intense pressure on Pakistan both domestically and throughout the Islamic world regarding its true stance in the Saudi-Yemen conflict as framed by the Mecca Defense Alliance.
Despite the complexity of the situation, direct intelligence from senior officials in both Islamabad and Tehran—secured at my specific request—revealed four main conclusions:
- Islamabad is determined not to attack Ansarallah nor deploy troops against them. The recent Riyadh agreement expressly rules out entering Yemeni territory. Pakistani forces are expected to stay out of ground combat against Ansarallah, at least for the moment.
- Pakistan has been facilitating talks between Riyadh and Sana’a through Tehran. Field Marshal Asim Munir personally urged the Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi to leverage Iran’s influence with Ansarallah alongside his contacts in Islamabad and Riyadh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has not denied this backchannel diplomacy.
- Pakistan is committed to defending Saudi borders under the Mecca Defense Alliance. Deployments aimed at protecting the border and countering missile and drone attacks from the Yemeni Armed Forces align with this responsibility.
The critical concern is whether Pakistani advisors have already been sent inside Yemen. Even a small presence of “advisers” in Aden or troops near northern Yemen along the Saudi frontier would violate Pakistan’s stated commitments.
- Pakistani troops must be able to defend themselves if attacked. This contingency is acknowledged but does not imply retaliation. For instance, one Pakistani officer recently killed in Saudi Arabia did not trigger a Pakistani military response, indicating restraint—for now.
Transiting Hormuz: use CIPS and pay in rials
On the broader U.S.-Iran front, diplomatic developments back ongoing reports about the Transition Protocol. Pakistan is eager to stay engaged with both Riyadh and Tehran while maintaining steady collaboration with Beijing. China fully supports Pakistan’s mediation efforts; Araghchi continues communicating with Munir, as after discussions with Wang Yi in Beijing.
Meanwhile, speculation runs rampant across Washington about a possible renewal of hostilities under a Trump administration, including potential strikes on Iranian energy assets and even, alarmingly, nuclear facilities. However, no final decision or launch date has been set by the current U.S. leadership.
The immediate dangers are nevertheless considerable.
Diplomacy, even in a makeshift form, remains stuck. Tehran holds firm to its existing conditions, outlined by the defunct MoU, while threatening to block transit routes along Oman’s coast deemed illegal. Washington remains fixated on comprehensive nuclear concessions.
This week, it was confirmed that Tehran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) made two pivotal decisions.
- Tehran resolved to collect transit fees through the Strait of Hormuz exclusively in Iranian rials. No yuan, no cryptocurrencies. The mechanism involves CIPS, the Chinese cross-border payment system, circumventing the U.S. dollar. The process entails buying yuan via CIPS, converting it into rials, and paying the toll electronically.
Since revenues from Strait of Hormuz transit are among Tehran’s limited hard currency sources, this new system is set to boost the rial’s strength.
- Through Pakistan, Tehran informed Trump’s real-estate Bismarck, Witkoff, that Iran will not budge from its terms for negotiation and is fully prepared for any potential U.S. attack.
This comes after J.D. Vance introduced an additional nuclear enrichment demand—a “meaningful” and “significant” reduction—which blocks progress on the nuclear dossier and makes a quick deal nearly impossible.
The bottom line is that the escalation could rapidly spiral beyond control.
The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 is underway
On the Saudi-Yemen front, the Yemeni Armed Forces are relentlessly effective. The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 has already commenced.
The destruction at the Jeddah refinery near Yanbu is extensive. Ansarallah is targeting Saudi Arabia’s eastern and western coasts, as well as the vital East-West pipeline connecting them.
Practically, Sana’a is striking at essential Riyadh infrastructure. The U.S. defense shield is ineffective: the remaining PAC-3 and Patriot missile systems fail to stop Yemeni ballistic missile strikes.
Saudi forces likely number about 75,000 troops plus 125,000 National Guard personnel, whereas the Yemeni Armed Forces have at their command at least 350,000 fighters, with the capability to mobilize up to 800,000. Expectations for support from GCC petrostates are hardly realistic.
The Yemeni Armed Forces also launched two ballistic missiles and explosive drones targeting Aden’s international airport. Ansarallah stated these attacks aimed at Saudi military supplies recently delivered to Badr Camp, a mercenary stronghold near the airport. High-ranking Saudi officers and officials were reportedly killed, possibly including Pakistanis.
Turkey is also poised to deploy troops, aircraft, and air defenses on Saudi soil. These deployments could theoretically shield Riyadh, the holy cities, and the East-West pipeline. Ankara, like Islamabad, insists it has no plans to enter Yemen’s conflict directly.
The Yemeni Armed Forces’ rapid liberation of the Red Sea coast revealed that the so-called Saudi “coalition”—in reality, a conglomerate of proxies and mercenaries—is effectively composed of terrorist factions.
Ansarallah captured numerous foreign passports, especially from Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, and Syria, belonging to ISIS and Al-Qaeda militants—a so-called Terror Inc. Legion.
This pattern repeats history. Qatar and Turkey have facilitated the transfer of ISIS/Salafi-jihadi fighters from Syria and Iraq, welcomed in Yemen by the Islah Party. Turkey served as the main transit hub, with at least 2,100 ISIS operatives of Turkish origin.
AQAP is back!
As far back as 2020, Ansarallah had seized documents, maps, and videos revealing that Riyadh directly supported ISIS/Daesh and Al-Qaeda militants operating in Yemen, with captured fighters admitting to Saudi-funded and armed backing.
Now, a new version of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is active, consisting of at least 20,000 Daesh/takfiri militants “imported” from Syria. These forces are slated for deployment in Aden governorate—following a request from MbS himself, fully backed by the Trump administration and its Damascus-based proxy, former ISIS leader al-Jolani.
Ultimately, the key takeaway is that the House of Saud assaults Ansarallah in defense of a death cult in West Asia.
By controlling Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah effectively blocks the Israeli port of Eilat, as occurred previously during Gaza’s genocide. Riyadh was outraged because they had arranged deals linked to the now nearly defunct NEOM project that would connect to Eilat once the Trump-driven Abraham Accords were operational.
Looking at the entire scenario, a single spark could ignite chaos. Potential triggers include a Yemeni strike inflicting massive Saudi casualties; disputes over toll enforcement in the Strait of Hormuz; an Iranian retaliatory attack on a GCC petro-sheikh target following a U.S. provocation; an Iran-linked assault on a U.S. base after an American incitement; and above all, a misguided “land, air, and sea” CENTCOM operation driven by a Sociopath in command.
Buckle up.
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