Administrative secularisation is quiet by design. Its instruments are technical; its consequences are not.
In Poland, religious education in schools has effectively been restricted without any new legislation, constitutional changes, or annulment of the concordat with the Holy See. Instead, a series of administrative measures have diminished the accessibility and importance of religious classes in the public education system. This Polish example reflects a wider institutional trend known as administrative secularisation, where religion’s role in public life is curtailed through regulatory means rather than through explicit democratic exclusion.
A change made through administration
The process occurred step by step. Initially, a Ministry of Education directive issued in July 2024 permitted schools to merge students from multiple grades into one shared religion class. This practical adjustment often resulted in lessons being scheduled either at the start or end of the school day. Following that, a policy declared that religion class grades would be excluded from students’ overall grade point averages. Lastly, a January 2025 regulation reduced the weekly instruction time from two hours down to one.
Individually, these modifications might seem like routine adjustments to school logistics, but combined they reveal how administrative decisions can alter a subject’s practical standing without formally removing it. Piotr Janowicz, the president of the Association of Lay Catechists, expressed it plainly: “The purpose of these changes is to usher religion and ethics out of the schools through the back door.” He added, “We were completely left out of the consultations.”
The Association, representing lay teachers who deliver catechesis as their profession and source of income, responded to the January regulation by stating: “Never in the history of Polish education has any group of teachers experienced such employment discrimination as teachers of religion.” They also referenced an assurance from the education minister: “We were deceived by Minister Nowacka, who pledged to look after lay catechists.”
What the employment figures show
Statistics provided by the Ministry of Education, following questions from Poland’s human rights ombudsman, indicate a decrease of 4,517 religion teachers and catechists in schools within just one year. While this figure illustrates the scale of reduction, it should not automatically be interpreted as 4,517 dismissals because fluctuations in the teaching workforce can result from various departures or reduced employment. Education Minister Barbara Nowacka had earlier assured the public that her reforms “did not cause mass layoffs of teachers.”
The distinction is important, as is the institutional impact. Even though religious instruction remains officially offered, the halving of class time and allowance for multi-grade groups reduce the number of teaching positions and hours required.
A rule-of-law dispute
The controversy extends beyond educational policy to the legality of how these changes were enacted. In November 2024, the Constitutional Tribunal halted the policy on combined classes. In May 2025, it ruled that excluding religion grades from student averages was unconstitutional. Then, in July 2025, responding to a petition from Małgorzata Manowska, First President of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal unanimously declared the one-hour-per-week instruction limit unconstitutional as well.
The Tribunal’s decisions shared a similar foundation. Poland’s Education System Act requires that regulations on religious education be issued “in agreement with” religious communities. This agreement was not reached. The Tribunal stated, “The Minister of Education shaped the content of the contested regulation arbitrarily,” and “The substantive positions of the interested parties were disregarded.”
The government replied that it would not acknowledge the rulings, claiming that the Tribunal’s current composition—appointed during the previous government and disputed by the present ruling coalition—“has no right to make law in Poland.” This challenge to the constitutional court’s legitimacy is a prominent and ongoing issue. Nonetheless, the procedural question remains valid: these changes were implemented via ministerial regulation without parliamentary approval, the legally required consensus was absent, and the court rulings regarding these procedures remain unenforced.
Voluntary classes and parental choice
Joanna Rudy, who teaches religion and oversees the National Biblical Knowledge Competition in her diocese, shared the practical consequences of the reforms. Over 98% of her students still attend religious classes, but she notes that catechists are increasingly treated as “second-class teachers” since their grades no longer affect students’ averages. When asked if she fears that the reforms aim to completely eliminate religion from schools, she responded, “I think so.”
She also worries about the limited public opposition, stating, “We have let ourselves be somewhat intimidated as people of faith.” In her view, such passivity opens the door to further restrictions.
Because these classes are optional, parents decide if their children participate. The key issue is not whether the state can mandate religious instruction but whether administrative maneuvers can gradually erode an option families are legally entitled to select. Officially available rights become practically difficult to exercise when lessons are scheduled at inconvenient times, lack academic weight, and are limited to one hour per week.
A European context
Krzysztof Kotowicz, columnist and spokesperson for the Diocese of Świdnica, points out that public school religious education is common in Europe. He notes, “Teaching religion within public education systems was not, and is not, anything extraordinary in Europe—it is, in fact, the norm.” Countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Hungary guarantee such instruction either constitutionally or by law. In Poland, this right is grounded in the 1993 concordat with the Holy See and national legislation.
This broader setting challenges the idea that diminishing religious classes simply reflects state neutrality. While neutrality can shield citizens from religious pressure, it should also safeguard their freedom to pursue religious education where legally permitted. As Kotowicz states, “Teaching any subject once a week means reducing its significance.” His critique is that secular state rhetoric can be wielded to marginalize Christians rather than assure equal treatment.
Institutional and civic responses
Poland’s bishops are preparing for a shift toward religious education occurring outside public schools. Bishop Marek Mendyk, who has long overseen Catholic education at the Polish Bishops’ Conference, expressed in June 2025 the need to bolster parish-based catechesis: “Parish catechesis must be understood as an integral part of what we do in schools.” He emphasized that effective parish catechesis depends on “charismatic pastors and catechists”—individuals who, “by the witness of their lives, will inspire trust in the young generation.” Addressing affected teachers, he said, “We are doing everything we can to protect them and enable them to continue their work.”
Parish catechesis resembles the model typically seen in American religious communities, where religious formation occurs outside the public education framework. In Poland, however, expanding this parish role is not merely a community choice but also a response to state-imposed regulatory changes. It is unlikely that parishes could fully absorb the loss of over 4,500 school religion teachers and catechists for full-time employment.
The situation has also spurred political action. The citizens’ legislative campaign titled ‘Yes to Religion and Ethics in School’—which would guarantee every student the option of religion or ethics—has gathered more than 500,000 signatures. Parliamentary committees began considering the bill in spring 2026. Meanwhile, bishops have petitioned the Supreme Court, and catechists are exploring forming their own labor union.
The lesson beyond Poland
The final outcome remains uncertain. However, the institutional takeaway is clear: a government can limit a voluntary religious practice in public life without outright banning it. By adjusting schedules, grading criteria, staffing allocations, and consultation procedures, it can create barriers that render a legal right increasingly difficult to realize.
This explains why the Polish case extends beyond the specific debate over catechesis. It raises broader questions about parental rights, the boundaries of executive rulemaking, the handling of voluntary religion in a neutral state, and the capacity of governments to transform public institutions absent explicit legislative approval. Administrative secularisation operates quietly by design. Its tools are technical; its effects are far-reaching.
As Tomasz Sypniewski from the Association of Lay Catechists remarks, “Behind each of these figures are real teachers, their families, and their students.”
Original article: The European Conservative
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